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4ABSTRACT
EU/US AND TURKEY TO MEDIATE THE CONFLICT IN BOSNIA:  A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY
REINA ZENELAJ
Master of Arts in Conflict Analysis and Resolution
MA Thesis, 2011
Thesis Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Nimet Beriker
Keywords:  mediation, Turkey, Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia, European Union, United States, 
Butmir Process, power, identity, reconciliation.
This thesis assumes a substantial change in the situation of conflict in Bosnia 
especially in the sense of political dialogue and economic cooperation due to the 
mediation of Turkey which started since October 2009. In addition, it also 
acknowledges the failure of the mediation conducted by European Union and United 
States jointly in the region of Bosnia Herzegovina during the same month which could 
not alter at all the political deadlock. Both mediations agreed on the argument that the 
political deadlock and lack of cooperation between parties in the region of Bosnia-
Herzegovina threatens state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Therefore, the goal of 
each mediation was to ensure a permanent recognition of Bosnia- Herzegovina’s full 
sovereignty. 
The fact that two different mediators worked for the same goal, at the same time 
and in the same region but achieved different results triggered our research in looking 
further factors that may have determined success in mediation.  For this purpose, after 
affirming success in the Turkish mediation by looking at the variables of success in 
5mediation received from a thorough literature review, we searched the literature on 
determinants of mediation outcome which cited us four main factors determining 
success in mediation.  These are listed as: 1) Characteristics of the Parties, 2) Nature of 
the Dispute, 3) Characteristics of the Mediator and 4) Mediation Strategies. 
Based on the comparative case findings, the analysis shows that multi party 
regimes, small power differences, positive past relationship, right timing and lack of 
complex issues facilitate the mediation process. Furthermore, it advocates the argument 
that low intervention strategies are more successful in post-crisis tensions. However, 
contrary to the literature, the study demonstrated that individual mediators may be more 
successful than regional mediators and that successful mediation is not only related to 
the possession of resources that either or both parties value but it is also related to the 
ability of the mediators to fulfill their promises and share these resources.
6ÖZET
BOSNA’DAKİ ÇATIŞMALARI YATIŞTIRMA SÜRECİNDE AB/ABD VE 
TÜRKİYE: KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR ÇALIŞMA
REINA ZENELAJ
Uyuşmazlık Analizi ve Çözümü Alanında Yüksek Lisans
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2011
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Nimet Beriker
ANAHTAR KELİMELER: Arabuluculuk, Türkiye, Bosna, Hırvatistan, Sırbistan, 
Avrupa Birliği, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Butmir Süreci, Güç, Kimlik, Uzlaşma
Bu tez, Ekim 2009’dan beri devam eden Türkiye’nin arabuluculuğuyla 
Bosna’daki çatışma durumunda, özellikle ekonomik işbirliği ve siyasi diyalog 
anlamında, büyük bir değişikliği varsaymıştır. Buna ek olarak bu tez, aynı ay içinde 
Bosna-Hersek bölgesindeki Avrupa Birliği ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri tarafından 
ortaklaşa yürütülen politik anlamda hiçbir yenilik getirmeyen arabuluculuğun 
başarısızlığını da onaylamaktadır. Her iki arabulucu da Bosna-Hersek bölgesindeki 
taraflar arasındaki işbirliği eksikliği ve politik çıkmazlığın devlet egemenliği ve toprak 
bütünlüğünü tehdit ettiği argümanı konusunda hem fikirlerdir. Böylelikle, her iki 
arabuluculuğun amacı da Bosna-Hersek’teki tam egemenliğin kalıcı olarak tanınmasını 
sağlamaktır.
İki farklı arabuluculuğun aynı amaçla aynı zamanda ve aynı bölgede çalıştığı ve 
farklı sonuçlara ulaştığı gerçeği araştırmamızı arabuluculukta başarıyı belirleyen diğer 
faktörleri araştırmaya yöneltmiştir. Bu amaçla kapsamlı bir literatür taramasında elde 
edilen arabuluculuğun başarı değişkenlerine bakılarak Türk arabuluculuk başarısı teyit 
edildikten sonra, arabuluculuk sonucunu belirleyici konular hakkında literatür taraması 
yaptık. Bu bizi arabuluculuktaki başarıyı belirleyen dört ana faktöre götürdü. Bu 
faktörler şunlardır: 1) Tarafların özellikleri 2) Tartışmanın doğası 3) Arabuluculuğun 
özellikleri 4) Arabuluculuk stratejileri.
7Bu karşılaştırmalı çalışmanın bulgularına dayanarak analiz sonucu, çok partili 
rejimlerin, küçük güç farklılıklarının, olumlu geçmiş ilişkinin, doğru zamanlamanın ve 
karmaşık sorunların olmaması arabuluculuk sürecini kolaylaştırdığını 
göstermektedir.Buna ek olarak bu çalışma düşük müdahale stratejilerin kriz sonrası 
gerginlikte daha başarılı olduğu düşüncesini savunmaktadır. Buna rağmen literatürün 
aksine bu çalışma, bireysel arabulucuların bölgesel arabuluculardan daha fazla başarılı 
olabileceğini göstermektedir. Aynı zamanda başarılı arabuluculuk sadece bir tarafın 
veya her iki tarafın kaynaklara sahipliğiyle ilgili olmasıyla değil, aynı zamanda bu 
kaynakları paylaşmak ve sözlerini yerine getirmek konusunda arabulucuların 
yetenekleriyle ilgili olduğunu ortaya çıkarmaktadır.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The main goal of this study is to look at the main factors determining mediation 
success or failure. To achieve this objective, we compare the EU/US and Turkey 
mediations in Bosnia Herzegovina and look at the variables that determined success in 
the Turkish case and failure in the EU/US attempt. The overarching goal of the two 
mediations which started in October 2009 was to maintain Bosnia’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity which was threatened by the current political deadlock. Therefore, 
keeping in mind that the mediation outcomes and mediators were different and region, 
timing and goal of intervention were almost the same, through the focused comparative 
methodology, we attempted to look at whether there were further factors determining 
success or failure in mediation. 
1.1 Why Bosnia? 
Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH) is still a country in transition. Although the war came to 
an end in 1995 and the Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats negotiated a peace 
agreement mediated by the United States, the EU and Russia, the country still remains a
potential area for conflicts. Since it was established in the form of two semi-
autonomous entities: the Federation of Bosnia- Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, 
representatives of the Republika Srpska have repeatedly asserted the right to secede 
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from Bosnia Herzegovina. Currently, two major Croat parties excluded from the 
government of the Federation, refused to recognize its legitimacy and formed their own 
assembly. Additionally, they have called for separation from the Federation and the 
creation of a third “Croat” entity which further threatens the fragmentation of the 
country.
After fifteen years, the international community’s efforts to stabilize the country 
have produced no result. Recently, the international community has become unwilling 
to directly intervene in the country fearing a backlash of the Bosnian Serb leaders. Thus 
it has decreased its support for the Office of High Representative which can fire and 
take other actions against local leaders and parties as well as impose legislation in order 
to implement the peace agreement, and led European Union to enhance its role as an 
inducement for centralization and consolidation of the Bosnian State. The criteria of US 
and EU for Bosnia relate to constitutional reforms to make Bosnia’s central government 
institutions more effective so that the country can become a candidate for NATO and 
EU membership.
What triggered our research on the Bosnian Conflict was exactly the reason that 
despite the fact that Bosnia still remains a potential problematic area not only for the 
Balkans but for Europe as well; the international community has lost interest in it.  
Continuous failures to realize the given objectives and achieve the conditions for 
consolidating the state structures have increased the internal tensions and may risk 
challenging the regional stability. In this understanding, it becomes clear that there are a 
lot of essential political issues that need to be resolved and mediated by international 
actors. Our study wanted to grasp this momentum, when the international mediation 
became so crucial, by analyzing the role of the two most important mediation attempts 
undertaken to ameliorate the political deadlock in Bosnia and to push the country 
toward Euro-Atlantic integration. We compared the mediations of EU/US under the 
framework of the “Butmir Process” and Turkey by addressing the following questions:
1. Which factors or determinants affect mediation outcome? Which of these 
strategies or techniques appeared to be more successful?
2. Do the findings of this study affirm the current literature on mediation success?
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On the one hand, European Union appears to be a very influential actor in regional 
politics due to its ability to offer access to Europe’s greatest organization and one of the 
world’s largest markets. Additionally, EU can offer to Bosnia the privilege of engaging 
in political dialogue on a daily basis and interacting culturally with no border barriers. 
Although not yet a hard power, EU can prepare it to adopt reforms on human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law that are so necessary to realize peaceful integration and 
regional stability. Moreover, United States as a strong hard power can aid Bosnia to 
become a member of NATO, the world’s largest regional military organization. Thus, it 
could ensure security and order and signal an end to tensions for violent conflicts and 
civil crisis, due to the main principle of NATO stating that an attack against one 
member of NATO shall be considered an attack against all members.1 Therefore, 
Bosnia would not only gain domestically by establishing peace within the country but 
also internationally, by improving foreign relations at a regional level and even beyond 
that.  Thus, a successful EU/US mediation meant a step nearer to long-term peace and 
sustainability. 
On the other hand, Turkey has been one of the most favorite countries for Bosnia 
Herzegovina due to their deep historical, cultural and social bonds. It has supported 
Bosnia during the war and contributed to its reconstruction. Additionally, Turkey has 
shared common goal with Croatia such as the integration in Euro-Atlantic structures, 
regional cooperation and establishment of peaceful relations. Furthermore, despite 
several tensions with Serbia, Turkey recognizes Serbia’s central importance to establish 
peace and thus it supports its integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. Currently, 
Turkey has widened its cooperation with the three countries in various fields such as 
economy, culture, education, health etc. 
Although both actors enjoy a positive and legitimate position in front of their 
parties, the results of the mediations demonstrated that this characteristic of the 
mediator is not enough to conduct a successful mediation process. 
                                                            
1 Article 5, North Atlantic Treaty. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm, retrieved on 8 June 
2011 
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1.2 Thesis Outline
After the Introduction Chapter, Chapter Two introduces a research on how the 
scholars defined success in mediation and after obtaining a list of variables, we 
reviewed the literature on mediation outcome which gave us a framework of the 
main determinants needed to conduct a successful mediation process. 
Before moving to the case studies, it was crucial to provide a chapter on the 
historical background of the conflict in Bosnia in order to learn the historical context 
that the conflict emerged and evolved and the attitudes and conditions of each actor 
in certain times. Therefore, Chapter Three served this purpose. 
The Fourth Chapter introduces the comparative case study methodology used in 
this study and explains the technique of research employed to establish the relation 
between the literature on mediation and the characteristics of the cases. 
Answers of our research questions start to be given in Chapter Five, which 
analyzes all features of the “Butmir Process” or the EU/US mediation and reveals 
the outcome of the intervention. 
Chapter Six fulfills the same objective of looking at the mediation conditions of 
Turkey and analyzing its characteristics according to the framework obtained from 
the literature review. 
The last chapter compares the findings obtained from the two previous chapters 
on the mediation cases of EU/US and Turkey and assesses the methods of each 
mediation. It ends up by some concluding remarks about the impact of this study on 
the overall mediation literature. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Mediation is one of the most widespread forms of conflict management 
techniques that includes a third party assistance to two or more contending parties to 
reach to a solution without resorting to force.2 Although it follows no structure or set of 
process, it certainly needs to be non-coercive in nature, ad hoc in orientation and 
voluntary in performance and structure. 3 The main objective of any mediator is to 
change, reduce or at best resolve the conflict through reliance on persuasion, appeals to 
logic, and the use of information and of other material, political resources that the 
mediator applies during the process. 
Jacob Bercovitch recognizes three dimensions of the mediation process: One 
dimension comprises the relationship between the conflicting parties and the mediator; 
the second one involves the behavior of each contending party shaped within the 
mediation context and the third dimension relates to the outcomes that come out of the 
process. 4 All these dimensions intertwine according to the parties’ interests, the 
mediator’s interests and the overall interests of managing the conflict. This helps us 
                                                            
2 Kleiboer, M. 1996. “Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation”.Journal of Conflict Resolution.
40:2, p.1
3 Bercovitch, J. 2007. “Mediation Success or Failure, a Search for the Elusive Criteria”. Cardozo Journal of Conflict 
Resolution. 7:2, p.2
4 Bercovitch, J. 1995. Resolving Iinternational Conflicts: the Theory and Practice of Mediation, Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner. ch.1, p. 3
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understand the reason behind different kinds of mediation behavior and outcomes, but at 
the same time it also reveals the complexity of a conflict. Due to this, the field required 
very detailed and systematized researches in order to provide insights of the various 
methods to use in mediation processes and variables to interplay in mediation decisions 
that enable the accomplishment of the desired outcomes. Hence, the study of mediation 
has been dominated by various approaches.  Some of the scholars have tried to explore 
mediation through the single case study tradition, whereas some others have applied 
game theories, experimental studies or used interviews, observations and other 
empirical tools.5  In all the cases, the main goal has always been to analyze the main 
factors and variables that affect the mediation process and build up frameworks or 
structures that lead to successful mediation outcomes. 
Therefore, this part seeks to explore the methods of how successfully to manage a 
conflict; however, before considering it, we need to develop a clear understanding of 
what genuinely constitutes success. The issue of assessing outcomes of conflict 
mediation processes is a tricky one and the evaluation criteria has often been taken for 
granted, however defining mediation success is part of a wide interdisciplinary 
discussion. For the purpose of our study, this section will present a comprehensive 
review of the main criteria for successful intermediary interventions introduced in the 
mediation literature. 
2.1 Measuring Success in Mediation
The most common dependent variable used to measure success has been reaching an 
agreement.6 “By successful outcomes we mean producing a ceasefire, a partial 
settlement, or a full settlement “(Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille, 199, 8; Kriesberg 
                                                            
5 Bercovitch, J. 2004. “Mediation in Internationalized Ethnic Conflicts” Armed Forces & Society Winter.30:2, p.155
6 Sander, F.1995. "The Obsession With Settlement Rates". Negotiation Journal. 11:4, p. p. 329-332
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1991, 19; Susskind and Babbitt 1992, 31). The most positive effect of an agreement is 
that it stops the dispute and avoids the costs of leaving the dispute unresolved. 7 Kressel 
and Pruitt indicate that statistics  that have taken settlements as the main criteria of 
evaluating success, suggested that 60 -80% of the mediation cases from various fields  
tended to be successful  and in private sector US- labor relations area, the statistics 
produced even higher rates. 8
However, two years later Bercovitch and Langley produced stricter criteria for 
success than simply considering a ceasefire, partial or full settlement. They argue that in 
the context of international conflict, a ceasefire, partial or full settlement can be 
classified as a success if it occurs within a four week period. 9 Yet, William Ross did 
not consider the criterion as satisfactory enough, thus pointed out the argument that a 
successful mediation ideally secures to the disputants an agreement with high joint 
payoffs; the so- called integrative or win- win agreement. The disputant themselves may 
not reach an integrative agreement; therefore, a good mediator should create insights 
that produce win-win agreements.10 However, is integrative success an objective 
measure or it does it also depend upon the subjective evaluation? Honeyman, (1990) 
states that it is equally important for the parties to see the integrative agreement’s 
outcomes as fair and desirable and feel that the satisfactory agreement was reached with 
no pressure from the mediator.11 Therefore, mediators need to carefully balance the 
objective high joint outcomes with each side’s subjective satisfaction. 
Finally, the mediation intervention is called a success if the parties show willingness 
to implement the agreement. A research conducted by McEwen and Maiman in 1989 
                                                            
7 Ross, W. 2000. “Measuring Success in Mediation”. Mediation Journal. 1:1, p.5
8 Kressel K. and Pruitt D.1989. Mediation Research, San Francisco: Jossey- Bass .p.394-435
9 Bercovtich J. and Langley J. (1993) “ Evaluating Mediation Strategies: A theoretical and Empirical Analysis,” 
Peace & Change. 18:1, p. 3-25
10 McGrath, J. 1966. “A social psychological approach to the study of negotiation.” in R. V. Bowers (ed.), Studies on 
behavior in organizations: A research symposium Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press. p. 101-134
11 Honeyman, C. 1990. “On evaluating mediators”. Negotiation Journal. 6:1, p. 23-36.
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showed that parties implement agreements that come out of mediation procedures more 
readily than they do from other procedures like adjudication.12
Prior to them, success in mediation was defined as a situation in which both parties 
to the conflict formally or informally accept a mediator within five days after the first 
attempt.13 However, for some other scholars simply accepting a mediator does not 
indicate to us anything about the success in mediation process or mediation outcome. 
For this purpose, Blair Sheppard, who was one of the first scholars to present a 
systematic discussion of the notion of mediation success, argued that we need to 
distinguish between success in process or a successful outcome.14 For instance, success 
may be achieved if the parties felt empowered during the mediation process or 
perceived that their concerns were successfully addressed, although it might appear as 
there was no successful outcome.  Therefore, Sheppard later joined by Jessica Katz 
Jameson, defined fairness, efficiency, satisfaction and effectiveness as the main indices 
of success.15  As fairness appears to be an elusive concept itself, the scholars suggest 
measuring it by concrete indicators as: level of process neutrality, disputant control, 
equitability, consistency of results and consistency with accepted norms. Next to it , 
they argue that concrete measurement of fairness may mean little to parties if they 
themselves do not perceive the proceedings to be so, therefore “perception of fairness” 
is considered to be a priori than any other concrete measure of success. In addition, 
participants’ satisfaction is also largely related to personal perception and quality. In 
other words, satisfaction comes out as a result of achieving a goal or accomplishing 
some objectives, the sort of which are very specific to the personality of the parties and 
the environment of the conflict.  So, thinking of how open to interpretation these 
concepts are, the above mentioned scholars have admitted that the clearest indicator of 
measuring mediation success is the quality of effectiveness. Here, effectiveness is 
associated with any positive impact like moving from violent to non-violent behavior, 
                                                            
12 McEwen, C. A., & Maiman, R. J. 1989. “Mediation in small claims court: Consensual processes and outcomes” in 
K. Kressel & D. G. Pruitt (eds.) Mediation Research.San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, p. 53-67
13 Frei, D.1976. “ Conditions Affecting the Effectiveness of Mediation” Peace Science Society International Papers. 
26:1, p. 69
14 Sheppard, B.H, 1984. “Third Party Conflict Intervention: A Procedural Framework”. Research in Organizational 
Behavior. 6:1. p. 141-190  
15Jameson. J.K.1999. “Toward a Comprehensive Model for the Assessment of Intraorganizational Conflict: 
Developing the Framework”. International Journal of Conflict Management. 10:3 p. 268 - 294
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signing an agreement, accepting a ceasefire or settlement, or agreeing to a U.N. 
peacekeeping force, among others.  If any of these changes has occurred due to the 
mediation efforts, the mediation attempt can be classified as successful. 
However, while this variable can be easily measured and thus suggest us a concrete 
outcome, in itself it does not say much about the mediation process. For example, what 
if the signing of an agreement takes an inordinately long time to achieve or costs several 
times what it should have.”16 Therefore, can we say that an effective mediation outcome 
does indicate success even if it was not efficiently managed?  According to Susskind 
and Cruikshank, it is not, however for Sheppard and Jameson, as long as any of the 
above mentioned criteria do not stand alone, but are accompanied by at least one or two 
more other criteria, like satisfaction and fairness or satisfaction and effectiveness, then 
we can speak of a truly successful outcome without necessarily fulfilling all four 
criteria. In other ways, fairness in the mediation process and outcome cannot alone 
characterize a successful mediation if parties are not satisfied or if the process has not 
been effective and/or efficient. The same logic counts for all other indices.  
As already noted above, Susskind and Cruikshank (1997) followed a similar line by 
including both fairness and efficiency in their framework but at the same time they 
replaced satisfaction and effectiveness variables of Sheppard and Jameson with wisdom 
and stability. In addition, they give to efficiency the most weight. To them, “an 
agreement may not be all that elegant, but if it is achieved within a reasonably short 
time without entangling too many people, there is much to be said for it”.17
Holmes and Miller (1976) advocated that in case there is no immediate agreement
out of the mediation process, success is achieved if the mediator has been able to clarify 
the main issues and motives of each sides’ to make or withhold concessions.18 Part of it 
is also to help the parties overcome mental heuristic errors. Thompson (1998) and 
Neale and Bazerman(1991) explain the mental heuristic error as a process in which one 
or both parties relate their bargaining positions to incorrect variables. For instance, 
                                                            
16 Bercovitch, J. 2007. “Mediation Success or Failure, a Search for the Elusive Criteria”. Cardozo Journal of Conflict 
Resolution. 7:2.  p.6
17 Bercovitch, J. 2007. “Mediation Success or Failure, a Search for the Elusive Criteria”. Cardozo Journal of Conflict 
Resolution. 7:2, p.6
18 Holmes, J. G., & Miller, D. T. 1976. “Interpersonal conflict”. İn  Thibaut, J. W , Spence, J. T.  & Carson, R. C.  
(eds.) Contemporary topics in social psychology). Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press. p. 265-308
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suppose we are in a house sale negotiation in which a house owner wants to sell the 
house at the price of $45.000, whereas the customer can offer only $35.000. After a few 
days, the same customer receives an offer from another house seller to get a house that 
is similar to the previous one at a price of $30.000. Now, the customer will accept the 
first offer only if the owner agrees to sell it for at least $30.000. On the other side, the 
owner until now has never made a discount of more than $10.000 and thinks that if he 
lowers the price to $35.000, he will have made the biggest discount he has ever offered 
to any of his customers, and thus thinks that the deal will be achieved. However the 
agreement does not satisfy the customer, who now has a new limit. At last, the house 
owner may end up selling the house for a price lower than $30.000 because he may not 
have any other customer who offers above that price. So, the mediator should avoid 
such mental heuristic errors by informing each side about the other and warning them of 
how mental errors can often reduce their prevalence. 
In addition, if the mediator has helped the parties to resolve some of the issues 
despite not enough issues to reach an agreement, the mediation should be considered as 
successful since the parties may be closer to an agreement than they would be without 
the assistance of a mediator. 19 Furthermore, Kochan & Jick (1978) argued that if the 
parties have made any substantial concession or have made concessions to their 
respective limit, the mediator may have done all she/he can do because an additional 
concession that would lead to an agreement can be made until one or both disputants 
change their limits.20  Related to this, a mediator may have still performed a valuable 
service if he has made the disputants expand the range of options and avoid them 
becoming mentally “locked” into their respective settlement options.21
One additional criterion measure for success in mediation is the presence/absence of 
the narcotic effect. 22 According to it, a mediation process is considered to be successful 
if the parties do not become dependent upon the mediator. In other words, despite 
having reached an agreement or not, if the parties repeatedly turn to a mediator 
                                                            
19 Ross, W. 2000. “Measuring Success in Mediation”. Mediation Journal. 1:1, p.8
20 Kochan, T. A., & Jick, T.1978. “The public sector mediation process: A theory and empirical examinations.” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 22:1, 209-240.
21 Ross, W. 2000. “Measuring Success in Mediation”. Mediation Journal. 1:1, p.10
22 Ibid, page 11
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whenever a future disagreement arises without previously showing serious efforts to 
resolve it themselves, then they are victims of the so called “narcotic effect”. Thus, even 
if a mediator has accomplished any or all of the previous criteria, the occurrence of the 
“narcotic effect” may be a sign of failure rather than a sign of success. 
Apart from all these, Keashley, Fisher, and Grant (1993) substantiate that rapport 
building in mediation processes is more important than issue settlement23. Through it, 
they imply that improving the quality of the relationship between the parties by 
especially reestablishing trust (Ross & La Croix, 1996; Ross & Wieland, 1996) leads to 
at least the de-escalation of the conflict if not its full resolution.  Here, the mediator 
should undertake the important measure of successfully defining the power issues in the 
relationship and help the parties to a have a more cooperative motivational orientation. 
Bush and Folger (1994) and Weingarten and Douvan (1985) has named the process as 
“transformative” rather than “transactional” mediation by attaching to  a successful 
mediator more the role of a counselor than an issue oriented problem solving agent.  
A different approach of evaluating success in mediation comes from Tamra d’Estree 
that identifies the terms conflict settlement, conflict management, conflict resolution and 
conflict transformation as indicators that measure degrees of mediation success.24   
Conflict settlement and conflict resolution, as the two most notable outcomes, differ 
from each other in that a settlement reduces or eliminates the destructing part of the 
conflict generating behavior, whereas conflict resolution builds a relationship that not 
only resolves the conflict but even prevents its reemergence. Bercovitch advocates that 
the nature of conflict decides for the conflict management tools. For instance, if the 
conflict is small in scale, interpersonal or group conflict and interest based, then 
resolution would be a proper measure of success. However, when the conflict is large in 
scale, complex and value based, success would best be defined as the ability to settle the 
conflict and to end its damaging aspects. Actually, a similar discussion is sustained 
within international relations literature as well, in which the neo-realist supporters 
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consider attempts for conflict resolution to be unrealistic since conflicts are defined as a 
natural part of the power politic behavior. On the other hand, the idealists stand for a 
resolution of all malleable parts of social situations as conflicts are thought to be born 
out of structural discrepancies. Overall, the conflict management literature seems to 
favor the idealist understanding by positioning conflict resolution inherently superior to 
settlement.25  Furthermore, settlement sometimes is even seen as half damaging because 
it leaves the conflict open to chances of it erupting again. Nevertheless, the literature 
also emphasizes that conflict resolution is not always feasible like in cases when the 
negative feelings are too deep and the conflict is old, for that a cease fire or a settlement 
might be the only way forward. To conclude, the nature and the level of the conflict 
impact the means and goals of the process and thus, the evaluation of the notion of 
mediation success. 26
Success in mediation becomes an even more elusive criterion when it is separately 
evaluated according to short term and long term success and when especially short term 
success is studied as a potential antecedent of long term success. There is a common 
agreement among many social scientists that identifying key issues in a conflict, 
structuring the agenda, suggesting new ideas and exhibiting empathy toward the 
disputants are some forms of mediator behavior that contribute to short term success 
(Carnevale, Lira, & McLaughlin, 1989; Donohue, 1989; Zubek et at., 1992). However, 
Pruitt, Peirce,McGillicuddy, Welton and Castrianno were more concerned with the 
impact of the short term success in the long term process. Keltner (1987) and Pruitt& 
Rubbin (1986) argued that win- win agreements lead to compliance and improved 
relations between the parties. Hence, they assumed that reaching a sound agreement 
would predict long-term success. 
Short term success would be dependent upon reaching an agreement, immediate 
satisfaction with the agreement or goal achievement and long term success would be 
fulfilled if a compliance with the agreement has occurred, the relations between the 
parties are improved or if there doesn’t appear any new problem between 
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them.27Contrary to what scholars believed, the research study that consisted of 73 
community mediation cases showed that no relationship was found between short-term 
and long-term success28. For instance, clarity and feasibility of the agreement reached in 
the short-term did not mean that the parties would comply with it or that relations 
among them would be improved in the long term. However, although simply reaching 
an agreement or the quality of the agreement does not on its own make up long-term 
success, agreements that resolve immediate issues have greater long-term significance 
when the parties have friendly relations and trust each other and when contracts ( 
especially in commercial and labor – management cases) are supported by courts and 
business practices. 
In addition to all these, Haas’s (1986) success index comprises a more general 
approach of success in mediation by focusing on the behavioral impact of international 
mediation. To him, a mediation can be classified as fully successful when it makes a 
great difference to or settling a dispute; it is partially successful when its efforts initiate 
negotiation and dialogue between the parties; its success is limited when it achieves 
only a ceasefire or break in hostilities and finally it is unsuccessful when it has no 
impact on the dispute.29
Lastly, a very straightforward way of evaluating outcomes in mediation and 
determining their success or failure has come from Weiss who suggests measuring the 
effect of mediation against the goals it sets out to accomplish.30 To examine it, we need 
to approach mediators before the mediation starts and ask about their goals and 
expectations and after the mediation ask them on whether their goals have been 
accomplished or not. Bercovitch calls it as a process of measuring the objective 
outcomes by reference to mediator’s subjective evaluation of their goals. 31
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To conclude, as the above review suggests, the term success in mediation has been 
evaluated from a range of simply being accepted as a mediator within five days after the 
first attempt to achieving efficiency, satisfaction and effectiveness. Table I offers a 
summary of the main variables introduced in this section. 
TABLE I 
SUCCESS IN MEDIATION (A SUMMARY)
1. Entering into mediation within 5 days after the first attempt.
2. Reaching an agreement; ceasefire, a partial settlement or a full settlement.
3. Reaching an agreement; ceasefire, a partial settlement or a full settlement within 
four week period. 
4. Making a great difference to or settling a dispute. 
5. Achieving Fairness, Efficiency, Satisfaction and Effectiveness.
6. Achieving Wisdom, Stability, Fairness and Efficiency.
7. Fulfilling the pre-mediation goals. 
8. Attaining Integrative Agreements and being able to implement them. 
9. Managing or settling value based conflicts and resolving or transforming interest 
based conflicts. 
10. Clarifying issues and/or resolving some of the issues 
11. Making concessions on unresolved issues and/or making concessions to their 
respective limits. 
12. Expanding the range of options. 
13. Avoiding the narcotic effect.
14. Overcoming mental heuristic errors.
15. Improving relations between parties
16. Lacking of new problems between them.
17. Reestablishing trust between parties
18. Dealing successfully with power issues in the relationship
19. Helping the parties have a more cooperative motivational orientation. 
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2.2 Determinants of Mediation Outcome
The model developed by Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Willein (1991) identifies 
contextual and process attributes as independent variables in the study that interact to 
affect the mediation outcome which is the dependent variable. Regime type, power 
disparity between disputants and the nature of disputants’ former relationship are the 
three characteristics of the disputing parties that highly influence the effectiveness of 
international mediation. 32The study affirms the already existing idea that disputes 
involving two multi party regimes are generally more successful than those involving 
other regime types and the one-party state dyads are the least successful in mediation 
attempts. In addition, the smaller the power differences between the adversaries, the 
greater the effectiveness of international mediation (Ott, 1972; Young, 1967). Next, the 
study reveals that the probability of successful mediation appears to be the highest when 
parties are not only equal in power but are both relatively weak states. Lastly, Deutsch 
(1973) positions the previous relationship between the parties to be as one of the most 
important determinants of conflict outcomes. The probability of successful mediation is 
higher when mediating between friends and lower when mediating between historical 
adversaries. 
In addition, Ott (1972) argues that the success or failure of mediation is largely 
determined by the nature of the dispute.  Firstly, to be effective, mediation must take 
place at the right moment. Although there is little agreement as to what constitutes a 
‘right moment’ generally, the longer the dispute goes on, less likely will the mediation 
result in success. Actually, the main disagreement on this issue goes among Edmead 
(1971), who thinks that mediation will mostly succeed if it is attempted at an early 
stage, before the disputants begin to inflict heavy losses on each other, and others like 
Northedge and Donelan (1971) who suggest that mediation is more effective, when a 
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conflict has gone through a few phases and it must not be initiated if the sides have not 
shown any willingness for the amelioration of the conflict. The research conducted by 
Bercovitch,  Anagnoson and Wille (1991) proposed that although on the one hand 
longer disputes generally mean less chance for mediation; on the other hand there is a 
need for a minimum amount of time to pass before mediation becomes successful. In 
order to be able to conduct a successful mediation, disputing parties need to be at the 
stage of revaluating their policies and that mostly occurs after some crises or crisis like 
conditions are fulfilled. (Druckman 1993, 1994; Touval and Zartman 2001)33
Secondly, the chances of a successful mediation depend on the frequency of 
mediation attempts as well (Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille (1991). For instance, the 
probability of a successful mediation increases after one or two previous mediation 
attempts and decreases if the same mediator is attempting for the third or fourth time. 
Therefore, the duration of the dispute should go hand in hand with the issue of the 
timing of mediation when deciding for mediation.34  
Thirdly, scholars argue that the factor of dispute intensity is not less important 
than dispute duration. Jackson (1952) and Young (1967; 1968) suggested that the 
mediation will be accepted and be more successful if the intensity of the dispute is 
greater. Contrary to them, Brockner (1982), Burton (1969) and Modelski (1964) were 
among the firsts to claim that the greater the intensity, the higher the losses, the more 
polarized the parties’ positions will become and so more will the parties want to “win at 
all costs”. To support this view, Bercovitch added that international disputes with 100 –
500 fatalities are more successful when compared to international disputes with more 
than 1000 fatalities. 
Apart from all these, the nature of the dispute is highly characterized by the 
issues in the conflicts. A successful conflict management process and a successful 
mediation outcome highly depend upon the importance the parties attach to the issues 
involved. Bercovitch claims that mediations involving topics of ideology and 
independence are hardly negotiable whereas issues of security and sovereignty are more 
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resolvable. This also explains why during the Cold War, when ideology was mainly the 
issue of dispute, only one out of ten disputes of this category resulted in some success, 
whereas in non-ideological conflicts, mediation was more effective at a ratio of 13 out 
of 31 conflicts35.  However, Ott (1972) argues that unless national security interests are 
at stake, any mediation has good chances of resulting in success. 36 Whereas, Lewicki 
and Litterer (1985) group the conflict issues into tangible and intangible ones by 
including concrete elements of a case such as money, property and objectionable 
behavior as tangible issues and principles, moral rules or beliefs about one’s rights as 
intangible issues. To them, often, intangible issues , although not listed in the formal 
agenda, may be more important than tangible issues as they represent values and human 
needs that are felt and as such are ‘ not for trading’.37 Therefore, both the conflict 
parties and the mediator should pay attention to them; otherwise they may trigger rigid 
positions and hostile behaviors and thus bring the process to a deadlock. 38
Furthermore, Moore (1986) considers issues in dispute from a different aspect. 
To him, mediations are more manageable if issues are not complex. In other words, 
more complex the dispute is, less are the chances for an effective mediation. 39
Alternatively, some other scholars argue that more complex disputes enable greater 
opportunities for trade- offs and thus increase the chances for successful mediation. 
(Bercovitch 1984; Fogg 1985; Kolb 1983)
Another essential variable is related to the identity and the characteristics of the 
mediator. For Young (1967), Jackson (1952) and Northedge & Donelan (1971), 
impartiality remains at the heart of successful mediations in many situations.40
However, for Susskind & Cruickshank (1987), Zartman & Touval (1985), Brookmire & 
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Sistrunk (1980), mediation is not an exogenous process but a structural extension of 
bilateral bargaining and negotiation; therefore, rather than impartiality, a successful 
mediation is related to the possession of resources that either or both parties value. 41In 
addition, Frei’s data (1976) concludes that mediation attempts by superpowers are more 
likely to be successful than mediation attempts by medium or small powers. From a 
different perspective, international mediators with their high prestige and the wide array 
of possible strategies are best at resolving high intensity conflicts; whereas regional 
mediators are better resolving low-intensity conflicts due to their proximity, cultural 
similarity and comparative informality. Yet, individual mediators appear to be the least 
effective at achieving settlement when compared to international and regional mediators 
despite their state background. (Bercovitch&Gartner, 2006). In addition to all these, 
previous mediation efforts are important as they may have influenced the current 
conflict management outcome but they do not surely determine the existing outcomes.42
Other than these, scholars have also identified variables that examine the 
relationship between mediation behavior and mediation outcome. As many of them 
agree, this is the most critical variable affecting mediation outcome (Kochan &Jick, 
1978), since the above mentioned attributes are valid for the other conflict resolution 
tools as well. To state it more clearly, the above mentioned  variables would affect the 
negotiation process and outcome in almost a similar way, but what would decide for the 
chances of resolving conflicts through mediation techniques rather than using the other 
strategies like negotiation, adjudication etc, are the impact of the characteristics but 
mostly the effectiveness of tools employed by the mediator. 
The mediator may decide to adopt a fairly passive role, by simply acting as a 
channel of communication between the parties and exhibiting very little control over the 
interactions between the disputants (Burton 1984; Bercovitch 1992; Bercovitch and 
Houston 1996; Hopmann 1996; Zartman and Touval 1996; Bercovitch 1997 etc.) or he 
may use directive strategies by making substantive suggestions and pressuring the 
parties to accept them. From the low end of the spectrum to the high end of it, the 
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mediator can use conciliation-facilitation; procedural; directive; substantive; 
supervisory and sometimes unspecified strategies. When moving from the lowest to the 
highest end, the mediator starts with facilitating communication, controlling some 
aspects of the process of mediation, to affecting the content and process of negotiation 
and manipulating cost-benefit structures of the parties.43
The main goal of the mediator is to use the right techniques that identify 
agreements within the Zone of Agreement44 that is the overlapping range of possible 
nonviolent outcomes. Therefore, as actors do not have complete information regarding 
their opponents’ capabilities and intentions, a facilitative mediator would ensure that the 
disputant parties have access to all possible necessary information so that they can best 
estimate the range of mutually preferable outcomes. The low level mediation activity 
may include providing good offices or revealing information that mediators might have 
gathered independently. On the other hand, formulation or procedural mediation include 
mediators who propose new solutions to the disputants and help the actors to more 
easily choose an existing mutually acceptable alternative (Touval and Zartman 1985; 
Hopmann 1996; Zartman and Touval 1996; Bercovitch and Houstan 2000). Finally, the 
manipulative or directive/ substantive mediation uses the mediator’s position and 
leverage to influence the negotiation process. The main achievement of mediators using 
high intervention tools is to expand the zone of agreement and increase the immediate 
costs of continuing conflict by offering carrots – direct compensation, the enactment of 
favorable economic policies or other diplomatic concessions or sticks – economic / 
diplomatic sanctions, the threat of direct military intervention etc. 
For some scholars, the more active strategies have shown to be the most 
effective ones. (Hiltrop, 1985; Pruitt, 1989; Bercovitch, 1989). However, a study 
conducted by Beardsley, Quinn, Biswas & Wilkenfeld (2006) and supported by 
Bercovitch & Gartner (2006) claimed that facilitative mediation is best able to resolve 
commitment problems and ensure a reduction in post crisis tensions, whereas, 
manipulative mediation is more useful and effective in securing formal agreements and 
achieving overall crisis abatement. Hence, the latest research strongly challenges the 
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notion that mediation is mostly effective when it is directive and shows that low-key 
intervention may be more beneficial that it has been conventionally believed. Therefore, 
in a conflict which passes in different stages from escalation, stalemate to crisis 
reduction a balance of styles should be used if mediators are to maximize their overall 
effectiveness.45
To conclude, literature on determinants of mediation outcome indicates that
1) Characteristics of the Parties, 2) Nature of the Dispute, 3) Characteristics of the 
Mediator and 4) Mediation Strategies comprise the most important variables affecting 
success or failure in mediation. Figure I summarize all the indices introduced in this 
section. 
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CHAPTER 3: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Many conflicts in history remain in our memories for their great number of violent 
deaths and displaced persons and refugees but mostly for their bewildering mystery.  The 
most challenging part of each conflict has been about how to explain the detailed causes of 
the conflict and more importantly to understand why a solution to these conflicts is so 
evasive. 
The purpose and the organizational structure of this background part is threefold. First, 
it offers a thorough understanding of the background to the conflict by initially looking at the 
key demographics and identification of major actors. Next, the paper goes on with a brief 
strategic overview which traces the policy actions and options that have been used since the 
outbreak of civil war. Finally, it addresses key instruments of national policy and international 
diplomacy after the post – Dayton agreement by illuminating those strategies that aimed to 
promote conflict resolution although the promise for a favorable outcome was not always 
fulfilled. 
Bosnia – Herzegovina owns a particular geographic nature sitting in the Balkans and 
laying across important lines of communication from the interior of Europe to the coast of 
Adriatic. As such, it attracted the attention and ambitions of outside military powers from 
Byzantines to World War II.  In this way, the region passed from the control of one 
multinational empire to another. The Slav invasion established the linguistic identity of the 
region, whereas the Romes and Byzantiums brought their religious and education 
characteristics by founding on this way the branches of two ethnic groups based on religion, 
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which would later be known as the Croats of the Roman Church and the Serbs of the 
Orthodox Church. 46
After the fourteen and fifteen centuries, population movements were rare in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and the Slav population differed among each other in religious lines. After the 
Ottoman Invasion, a group of them returned to Muslims whereas the other Christian and 
Orthodox portion became the wards of their respective churches.  Nevertheless, they shared 
the same historical experiences, economic conditions and even a distinct ‘oriental – Islamic 
Cultural Heritage’ developed in the territories under the Ottoman rule, reflected in the 
adoption of Turkish and Arabic words and terms, the style of dress, art and architecture etc.47
However, despite these commonalities, the people of Bosnia developed a common feeling of 
homeland, which actually never developed into the idea of a Bosnian nation.48
Firstly, the Slavic Muslim population called themselves as ‘ Turks’, a term which 
meant for them ‘adherent to Islam’ until the region felt under the control of the Austrians , 
where to identify oneself as a ‘Turk’  was perceived as an indication for opposition. 49
Therefore, a great number of the Slavic Muslim population began to describe themselves as 
Muslims whereas a small number of the Muslim elites began to call themselves ‘Muslim 
Serbs’ as a reflection of their attraction to the independent Serbian state as a potential 
counterweight to the Austrian power. On the other side, some of the other Muslims began to 
declare themselves as Croats, mostly due to the increasing education of Muslim children in 
Serbo- Croatian Schools.  In this way, the Austrian occupation hastened the formation of a 
segmented society in which Serbs, Croats and Muslims would live their lives within the 
framework of their own Serb, Croat or Muslim institutions. 50 As such, the Muslim identity 
had been transformed from a thoroughly religious identity to a broadly ethnic, even national 
identity, through which the Muslims would distinguish themselves from both the Croats and 
the Serbs. 
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During all this time, Bosnia has never been an independent state, even in 1918 when a 
national council meeting in Sarajevo, Bosnia- Herzegovina asked for its adherence to 
Yugoslavia.  However, interesting enough the country was never fully assimilated in modern 
times due to it being relatively vast, largely inaccessible and ethnically indigestible. 51
Bosnia Herzegovina did not look up as an emerging nation; therefore, its inclusion into 
Yugoslavia’s structure in 1918 remained of no surprise. Since then Bosnia became an object 
of conflict and negotiation between the Croatian and Serbian nationalism where even its 
territorial boundaries apart from the nationalistic features were often adopted according to the 
scenario of the conflict.52 Only in 1943, Bosnia- Herzegovina’s boundaries were considered 
constitutionally inviolable after the communist leader Tito elevated it at the status of a 
republic, equal to the other five republics (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro and 
Macedonia).53 Nevertheless, for about 75 years, the boundaries of Bosnia Herzegovina were 
considered administrative in nature as can be internal boundaries. As such, many secret 
agreements were made, like the transfer of Bosnia – Herzegovina’s only usable outlet to the 
sea on the bay of Boka Kotorska at Herceg- Novi to Montenegro, and other partitions were 
realized without regards of Muslims interests. 54
The intensity of ethnic and nationalistic feelings as principle objectives of the individual 
Balkan Republics ran counter to the multi- ethnic, egalitarian idea; however this was not the 
major reason for conflict. The most popular idea has been that Bosnian conflict should be 
explained in terms of ancient ethnic hatred55 yet before 1992, the three ethnic communities of 
Bosnia Herzegovina were distributed among disconnected ethnic majority areas that differed 
from nearly homogenous to nearly evenly divided. Therefore, since the ethnic settlement was 
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not something new but rooted in the past, none of the ethnic groups could seek for neither a 
territorial or for a cultural autonomy.  Until 1992, most of the Muslims which made up around 
44% of the overall population were concentrated in urban areas, whereas Serbs and Croats 
making up around 33% and 17% respectively tended to inhabit rural areas. In other words, a 
given district could be populated by a Muslim majority in the urban-centered areas but was 
surrounded by a Serb-Croat population in the countryside, which clearly shows a peaceful 
cohabitation of different ethnicities. 56
With the final collapse of Soviet Union in 1991, the government of Bosnia-
Herzegovina was stimulated to hold a referendum on independence from Yugoslavia after 
Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia had already achieved it. The goal of the ethnically diverse 
republic was to establish itself as a nation by envisaging a democratic confederation of three 
ethnically based groups (Muslims, Serbs and Croats).  However, the Croats and Serbs were 
against their inclusion in the Bosnian borders and the elections of the three nationalist parties 
claiming to represent the three ethnic communities together with the election of Alija 
Izetbegovic, a Muslim leader, as the head of the collective republic presidency triggered 
further resistance and violent rebellions. Even before Bosnia- Herzegovina held the 
referendum, the two other ethnic groups had expressed their willingness to unite to their 
mother countries and to even form a separate republic within the borders of Bosnia-
Herzegovina as it was the case of the Serbian claims for the Republika Srpska.57  
Even though the independence was approved and recognized by United States and the 
major European countries, it could not prevent an open warfare between the Bosnian Serbs 
and Bosnian forces which one year later would advance to a three way war between the 
Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs and Bosniaks. More than 4.4 million people, which constituted 
almost half of the population, had been driven from their homes, around 250.000 people were 
dead and around 2 millions left the country either as refugees or as internally displaced.58 The 
war reached the peak in July 1995 with the Srebrenica Massacre organized and realized by the 
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Serbian forces which targeted the killing of around 8000 men and boys together with 25.000 –
30,000 Bosniaks59.After three years of bitter fighting among the Bosnian groups and the 
Yugoslav army, the Western Countries supported by North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), imposed a final ceasefire, named as Dayton Agreement. The Dayton Agreement was 
successful in imposing an extremely important ceasefire and thus establishing a negative 
peace, but it left the country undivided and ethnonationalism undefeated as the agreement 
framework did not address the political structure that had caused the war. Dayton Agreement 
decided for a federation state where 51% of the land would make up the Federation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina and 49% constituted the Bosnian Serb Republic.60 Since then, the International 
Community remained highly present in civilian and military affairs, especially with the 
position created for the High Representative, an international office responsible for 
monitoring the implementation of the civilian acts decided in the Dayton agreement. In 
addition to that, since seven years, international military presence is assured by around 1600 
European Union troops after NATO’s mission ended in December 2004. 61 Despite all 
international efforts, the fears for a renewal of the conflict have not been totally removed and 
continue to be promoted due to the high level of support to ethnic based political parties and 
due to the fact that almost 40 percent of the displaced returnees have not reoccupied their 
homes yet.62
Under the decisions of the Dayton Peace Accord, each entity control their own 
budgets, expenditures on infrastructure, healthcare and education. However, the multiple 
ethnic veto power has paralyzed the decision making process and the system functions only in 
cases the High Representative, who actually is responsible for monitoring the implementation 
of Dayton Accord, pressures the process and directly intervenes.  Even at the legislative level, 
approval of any decision requires the votes of at least one third of the members of each entity 
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in the House of Representatives, which makes the states heavily dependent upon the support 
of the entities and decreases its competences.63 Nevertheless, the process itself would be 
working unless parties had a strict nationalistic direction and perceive their positions as 
extremely diverging and conflicting with each other. 
The current political situation has highly frustrated and concerned the public that the 
continuous political confrontations may result in violence. 
“Before the war a referendum happened and it brought us to bloodshed. People are 
very scared of this talk about referendum in RS. It reminds them of the period right before the 
war. Even the word referendum makes people disturbed and produces fear.”64
In addition, people in Bosnia are also worried that the current political deadlock has 
endangered the economic situation where unemployment rates have reached high levels 
largely due to the fact that access to jobs depends on political and personal connections.
As a response to the current situation, EU suggests the conduct reforms that would 
lead to the establishment of a single, central and a multi ethnic state.  As, Wolfgang Petritsch, 
the third High Representative, argued, the general objectives of the international community 
are “…to reform the courts, to strengthen the judiciary and central institutions like the 
presidency and the council of ministers so that leaders have the tools to mend their blighted 
country. By creating a true civil society, a society that is based on ethnic cohesion, not 
division, we can enable the people to tackle corruption and other social ills for themselves.”65
Since Bosnia- Herzegovina joined the Council of Europe in 2002, the international 
community has intensified its calls to speed up constitutional reforms that have led state 
institutions into a deadlock since the entity and party- agendas have blocked the decision 
making process. As such, European Union in collaboration with United States has initiated 
two mediation attempts named as ‘Prud Process’ in November 2008 and ‘Butmir Process’ in 
October 2009, which endeavored to trigger dialogue between key domestic political 
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stakeholders on concrete institutional reforms that would improve the functioning of the 
country’s democratic institutions66. However, both mediations have failed so far.
On the other side, the Turkish government initiated its own mediation effort to 
maintain BiH’s sovereignty and territorial integrity by reconciling the states of Bosnia, 
Croatia and Serbia. Firstly, Turkey established a consultation mechanism between Serbia and 
Bosnia- Herzegovina in October 2009 that aimed to contribute to the reconciliation process 
between Serbia and Bosnia and thus encourage Serbia to influence the Serbs in Bosnia.
67Next, in January 2010, the Turkish government established a similar consultation 
mechanism among Bosnia- Herzegovina and Croatia. Important results rose out of this 
mediation attempt like the adoption of the Istanbul Declaration on Peace and Stability in the 
Balkans on 24 April 2010 signed by Bosnia- Herzegovina and Serbia.68 In addition to these, 
relations improved at the political and diplomatic level especially after it was agreed that BiH 
would appoint its ambassador to Serbia and after the Serbian Parliament adopted the 
Declaration of Srebrenica in March 2010 by which it officially apologized for its role in the 
Massacre in 1995.69
Following these outcomes, the end purpose of this paper is to analyze the Butmir 
attempt and the Turkish initiative by comparing the different mediation determinants of 
EU/US and Turkey on the case of Bosnia. The fact that the two mediations were held in the 
same region, for the same goal and at a very near time helps us to control our comparative 
cases and understand better the determinants that affected the outcome. Nevertheless, before 
we dig into this analysis, it is crucial to provide a more detailed chapter on the applied 
comparative methodology. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Comparative research is generally defined as the most efficient method to discover causal 
relations between various outcomes and configure variables that intervene in the process or 
remain static. Scholars have defined five types of comparative case studies listed as:
1. The single case study
2. The single case study over time 
3. Two or more cases at a few time intervals ( Focused Case Comparisons)
4. All cases that are relevant regarding the research question under review or Most 
Similar Systems Design (Aggregate Case Comparisons)
5. All relevant cases across time and space or Most Different Systems Design. 
(Aggregate Case Comparisons)70
Although they do not consider the single case study as genuinely comparative, they assert 
that single case study helps develop hypothesis and reasons of validation and observe whether 
or not the general results hold up in a more detailed analysis. However, for the purpose of this 
study, our interest is in the Two or more cases at a few time intervals type which otherwise is 
called as ‘focused comparison’.71 This research is generally preferred when the problem is 
difficult to analyze with a large number of cases. Daniel Druckman (2005) calls the focused 
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comparisons as an attempt to impose the logic of experimentation on a small number of 
cases.72
Our study endeavors to compare the mediations of EU/US and Turkey started two years 
ago to reconcile the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the aim of exploring the 
background and methods of each mediation and analyzing the outcomes achieved on this 
sensitive conflict. The reason that this study applies comparative case study researches is 
because they are generally used to examine patterns of similarities and differences across 
cases and try to come to terms with their diversity. Other than that, by employing a 
comparative case study approach, we try to eliminate the central weakness of the single case 
study method by incorporating comparisons into a research design. Thus, we aim that this 
comparative case study will be more revealing and more valuable.73
The first task of a Focused Case Comparison study is to specify the research problem and 
search for existing theories that bears on those issues. In our study, we aim to learn 
determinants of mediation success or failure in EU/US and Turkey mediations. To fulfill this 
objective, we looked at the literature on the determinants or factors of mediation outcome as 
well as we explored how the literature defined success in mediation. 
Secondly, the comparative research requires specifying the independent, intervening and 
dependent variables that enter into the controlled comparison of cases. In our study the 
dependent variables is success in mediation and it is measured through independent variables 
listed as: (1) Characteristics of the Negotiating Parties which included (a) Regime Type, (b) 
Power Status and (c) Parties’ Previous Relations with each other. (2) Nature of the Dispute 
that included (a) Duration and Timing of Intervention, (b) Intensity of the dispute, (c) The 
Type of Issues Involved.. (3) Characteristics of the Mediator that included (a) Power, (b) 
Rank & Identity, (c) Relationship with Parties, (d) Previous Mediation Experiences, and (4) 
Mediation Strategies defined as (a) Low Intervention or Conciliation- Facilitation Strategy, 
(b) Middle Intervention or Procedural- Formulation Strategy, (c) High Intervention or 
Directive, Substantive and Manipulative Strategy, (d) Supervisory and (e) Unspecified. The 
purpose of the study is to reveal the intervening variables. 
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Thirdly, the focused comparative research demands the selection of appropriate cases for 
the controlled comparison. In other words, we should define the universe from which the 
cases are selected and assure that the cases to be compared come from the same class or 
universe of cases. In our study, we looked at all mediation activities undertaken in Bosnia 
after the Bosnian war which target Bosnia Herzegovina’s post war tensions because the 
mediations before and during the war had a completely different scope and objective from the 
mediations after the war. While the mediations before and during the war aim the 
establishment of ceasefire, after war mediations work for consolidation of Bosnia 
Herzegovina state structures. From all post-war mediation cases, we picked the case of 
EU/US and Turkey for two main reasons: firstly, both attempt to ensure the permanent 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia which is threatened by the current political 
deadlock and secondly, both mediations start at a nearly same time. In this way, by comparing 
two mediation attempts done for the same region which is Bosnia; for the same goal which is 
maintenance of its permanent sovereignty and territorial integrity; and at almost the same 
time, October 2009, we decreased the differences of the cases and helped to maintain the 
comparison controlled. 
Fourthly, the causal relations between various outcomes and configurations of 
independent and intervening variables were discovered by analyzing the determinants of 
mediation outcome for both cases. From the beginning of this study, I know that the outcome 
of the mediations and the characteristics of the mediators are different. The Butmir Process 
was unsuccessful and produced no result whereas the mediation conducted by Turkey 
produced successful outcomes in several aspects. For instance, the mediation was successful 
in reaching several agreements and improving the relations between parties.  Abdullah Gül, 
Haris Silajdzic, and Boris Tadic, the presidents of Turkey, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia 
respectively, signed the Istanbul Declaration which guaranteed territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of BiH and called for peace, regional stability and economic development. 74. 
Next, relations improved at the political and diplomatic level especially after it was agreed 
that BiH would appoint its ambassador to Serbia and after the Serbian Parliament adopted the 
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Declaration of Srebrenica by which it officially apologized for its role in the Massacre in 
1995.75
Apart from the outcome, we also know that the region, timing and goal of intervention 
are similar. Therefore, we will look at whether there are further factors determining success or 
failures in mediation. 
The last task for a comparative case study research is to formulate the questions to be 
asked of each case in the controlled comparison. As already stated in the Introduction 
Chapter, our study addressed the following questions:
2. Which factors or determinants affect mediation outcome? Which of these 
strategies or techniques appeared to be more successful?
3. Do the findings of this study affirm the current literature on mediation success?
At the end, the performed analyses intend to address, refine or elaborate the theory 
articulated in the beginning. Daniel Druckman argues that few Conflict Analysis and 
Resolution theories are formulated precisely enough to permit rigorous testing; yet focused 
comparisons can identify causal patterns that occur in our interested cases.76
To conclude, our study employed a normative comparison research method which points 
out the most successful alternative among those studies differently from the descriptive 
comparison which simply states the similarities and differences without attaching a normative 
evaluation.77 The evaluative criterion is “success” defined according to the literature and
measured from the starting point until the end of the process. 
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CHAPTER 5: CASE I- EU/ US MEDIATION PROCESS 
The Butmir Process was the most serious mediation attempt after Dayton, motivated by 
the need to ensure Bosnia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity by revising the political 
arrangements of the Dayton Accord that strengthens the central governance, by replacing the 
Ministerial Council with an appropriate government and by granting more power to the office 
of the President. The political crisis that occurred in 2009 demonstrated the country’s political 
immaturity and the government’s inability to react against institutional paralysis. As such, the 
European Union supported by United States initiated talks among Milorad Dodik, Prime 
Minister of Republika Srpska, Sulejman Tihić of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), 
Haris Silajdžić of the party for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Zlatko Lagumdžija of the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP), Dragan Čović of the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) ,Božo Ljubić
of the Croatian Democratic Union 90 (HDZ 90) and Party of Democratic Progress (PDP) 
leader Branislav Borenović , to accommodate the constitutional changes and pave the way to 
self administration by terminating the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.78 The negotiation process was held in two rounds, 19 – 20 October 2009, led by 
Carl Bildt, as the EU representative, and assisted by James Steinberg, the US representative.79     
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EU openly stated that Bosnia-Herzegovina can never acquire membership unless the OHR 
closes down and Bosnia ceases to be a quasi-protectorate. Apart from that, the international 
mediators even warned the political leaders that the failure of talks would negatively impact 
the EU visa liberation policy for Bosnia.80           
The fact that the ethnic parties had very intense aggressive relationships in the past mostly 
due to the war in 1995 makes negotiation harder, however is it the characteristics of the 
parties and the nature of the dispute that inhibited the joint EU/US attempt to make even a 
symbolic progress towards a consensus or is it something beyond that?  This part will seek to 
analyze the reasons of failure by applying the characteristics of the case to the above 
mentioned theoretical framework. 
5.1 Characteristics of the Parties
The post-war Bosnian state was founded on a multi-party regime type where holding 
elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina was considered to be a priori as more than everything else; it 
supports the idea that the country’s political system holds elements of democracy. However, 
in practice, the electoral process obstructed the reconciliation process as the dominant 
political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina like the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), The 
Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ) etc, base most of their 
programmes on the protection of interests of their respective ethnicities.81 Whereas, the 
parties who have a state-wide political, social and economic programme, like Social 
Democratic Party (SDP), Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH)etc  remained in the 
minority and they were unable to attract the majority of the people and establish sustainable 
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political infrastructure.82 Therefore, political parties polarized along ethnic lines undertake 
narrow and sectarian reforms after they achieve electoral success and thus conditions of group 
insecurity and mutual distrust prevail. As a result, Bosnia-Herzegovina has been characterized 
by a burdensome decision-making process ruled by inefficient institutions. 
At the end of the war, the parties decided on a line that would divide Bosnia into two main 
entities: the Federation of Bosnia- Herzegovina which included the areas controlled by the 
Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) and Bosnian Croats and Republika Srpska which included the 
lands claimed by the Bosnian Serb leadership before the war. However, in order to reverse 
ethnic cleansing and restore ethnic integration, the Dayton Agreement tried to invest the three 
main ethnic groups with adequate political and legal representation in the country’s governing 
institutions between those who favored an independent central state and those who claimed 
for autonomy from it. 83 The constitution that came out of the Dayton Accord aimed to 
preserve ethnic identity and ensure that no single ethnic power would dominate national, legal 
or political structures. 
All institutions at the state level, otherwise called as ‘common institutions’ include one 
part Bosniak, one part Croatian and one part Serb in order to maintain a system of check and 
balances. For instance, the Presidency consists of three representatives from the ethnic groups 
who rotate the position of Chair but who nevertheless need to act in consensus in order to 
adopt a particular provision.84 In the same way, the bicameral Parliamentary Assembly that 
consists of the House of Peoples and the House of Representatives include representatives 
from each ethnic group where one Bosniak, one Croat and one Serb serve as the Chair and 
Deputy Chairs with the condition of Chair rotating among the three selected representatives.85
Furthermore, even the Constitutional Court that acts to uphold the national constitution or 
checks whether any provision of an Entity’s law is consistent with the national constitution or 
not, is composed of two Bosniaks, two Croats, two Serb members selected by the Republika 
Srpska National Assembly and three members selected by the President of the European 
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Court of Human Rights who should not be citizens of Bosnia- Herzegovina or any other 
neighboring state. 86
Slack and Doyon (2001) argued that the internal and external political interests made up 
the first main reason behind the division of the Bosnia-state into ethnic nationalist groups 
hostile to one another. Nevertheless, other social dimensions that prepared the population to 
mobilize had already existed before. Byrne and Carter (1996) add six social processes as 
history, religion, demographic, political institutions, economics and psycho-cultural factors 
that provide a political background of either peaceful or hostile ethnic nationalism. 87 Yet, all 
of them agree that the religious, economic and psycho-cultural factors are not the direct 
causes of collective actions, but they serve as antecedents manipulated by political action. In 
this understanding, it is wrong to view the Bosnian conflict as ethnic based and accept the 
ethnic fractures as historic and which will remain for the future. A recent study conducted by 
O’Loughlin (2010) reveals that older people have more friends from different nationalities 
due to the nature of pre-war Bosnia-Herzegovina with mixed communities and younger 
people showed higher preferences for mixed friendships. Therefore, while electoral politics in 
the case of Bosnia seems still ethnic based and as such the ‘ethnic card’ is usually played for 
electoral purposes, the ordinary people are willing to consider cross- ethnic cooperation.88  As 
such, there is a need to close the gap between the ethnic elites and their constituents in order 
to be able to transform relations from adversary to amicable ones. 
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5.2 Nature of the Dispute
The Bosnian conflict risks state sovereignty and territorial integrity because of the political 
impasse that resulted from two confusions: the Dayton Agreement did not clearly specify the 
nature of the Republica Srpska and that of the Bosnia- Herzegovina state itself and none of 
the entities had a clear understanding of the proper focus and functioning of the state politics 
as a system.89 Debates on revising Dayton in order to make a constitution comply with the 
political terms of European Union have failed due to a lack of political will and consensus 
from local leaders to have a more functional constitutional structure that will lead to EU 
accession and the withdrawal of international presence. 
  Although we don’t have a great number of fatalities to measure dispute intensity, the 
political impasse has spilled over the economic sphere where tens of thousands of people lost 
their jobs as a result of failure to ensure cooperation and fiscal coordination. As such, a 
quarter of working population seems to be unemployed and the other remaining majority 
gains low salaries and pensions. Apart from that, the political deadlock has also blocked the 
resolution of the refugee issue; as such 120, 000 citizens continue to be considered as 
internally displaced. 90
Therefore, the current state of the conflict in Bosnia Herzegovina mostly resembles to a 
stalemate as all ethnic groups remain deeply divided over the status of the state. While 
Bosniaks demand for a stronger government, Serbs support a weak state that would provide 
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them with autonomy rights and Croatians sometimes tend to claim for a third entity given the 
internal power struggles. 
In this regard, in the absence of local level political will, some have advocated for 
international intervention to push local leaders to address the required political changes. To be 
effective, mediation must take place at the right moment. Although the conflict in Bosnia has 
passed several phases, the parties had not yet shown any willingness for the amelioration of 
the conflict. After the Butmir Process, Premier of Republica Srpska Milorad Dodik called for 
the local leaders to convene together to find a way out of the constitutional crisis without 
international mediation; however, no local leader showed interest in. This clearly 
demonstrates that the parties were not themselves ready for negotiation and there was no way 
that any mediation of this type would make a difference. 91 In addition, the mediation initiated 
at a point when three ethnic parties were preparing for electoral campaigns and thus the 
situation left little room for compromise. Instead, the process somehow triggered leaders of 
the ethnic parties to consolidate their nationalistic positions and power and increase the 
support for their electorate.92 However, on the other hand, further delays to constitutional 
reform may also have jeopardized Bosnia’s future into the structures of European Union and 
NATO. Progress in terms of constitutional reform and closure of the Office of High 
Representative was made a precondition for faster visa liberalization, EU candidate status and 
NATO Membership Action Plan. Thus, the decision to postpone visa liberalization for Bosnia 
Herzegovina, which was claimed by EU representatives to be directly related to the negative 
results of parties’ negotiations on the constitutional arrangements, would further deepen the 
crisis and would increase the number of people believing in a discrimination of EU against the 
Bosniaks and reaffirming their perception that the government cannot influence in any ways 
on this issue.93
The Butmir Process aimed to prevent state fragmentation in Bosnia by seeking to 
resolve the issues of constitutional reform, division of state and military property and the 
future of the Office for High Representative. It seeks to remove the political impasse through 
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a package of constitutional, governance and political reforms that would enable the 
centralization of state system. Any meaningful constitutional change would mean 
reformulating the country’s power structures and adhering more power to centralized 
institutions. On the one hand, Bosniaks and Croats agreed on changing the balance of power 
but they found the reforms as not substantive enough. However, on the other hand, Milorad 
Dodik that politically leads the Serbs in Bosnia claims that he is not going to concede any 
Serb autonomy. 94 In addition, the representatives of Republica Srpska were more open to 
negotiations on state and military properties since that would bring the closure of the OHR as 
well but they showed strong resistance to the fulfillment of constitutional reforms which in 
fact to them meant losing some sovereignty. 
Lastly, although some scholars argue that when we have more than one issue, we can 
develop more space for trade- offs, sometimes complexity makes mediations less manageable.
Here complexity is not understood as multiple issues but issues which contradict the outcomes 
of each other. For instance, although OHR was not present physically in the Butmir process, 
making its future an integral part of the talks damaged its credibility as a neutral actor and 
complicated the negotiations. The main Bosniak parties (Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
SBiH, and Social Democratic Party, SDP) considered the Office of High Representative as 
their main negotiating leverage and they did not agree to fulfill the objectives that required its 
closure until the constitutional reforms are completed; whereas the Republica Srpska wanted 
to agree on property reforms that would push for OHR closure but not on constitutional 
reforms. 95Therefore, complexity triggered a deadlock in the process. 
To sum up, the Butmir process was mostly focused on the realization of constitutional 
reforms that would enable state centralization and division of state and military properties. 
The existence of complex issues and the lack of political will to come to an agreement 
somehow hardened the process. 
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5.3 Characteristics of the Mediator
The first main factors determining the characteristics of the mediator are its power, 
rank and identity. EU’s biggest asset that makes it an influential actor in these types of 
mediations is its ability to offer access to Europe’s greatest organization that is European 
Union. Once, a country is member of EU, it enjoys economic benefits by getting access to one 
of the largest markets of the world; political privilege by engaging in political dialogue with 
many powerful countries on a daily basis but also greater opportunities for cultural 
interactions due to free visa regimes. 
The fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina signed the Stabilization and Association 
Agreement with EU in 2008, showed its full commitment at least at the political level to 
becoming a member of EU.  Apart from it, a great majority of Bosnian population (around 
87,5%) would vote in favor of EU membership, which counts for commitment toward EU 
membership at the public level as well.96 In this way, EU is continuously gaining a more 
crucial role in Bosnia Herzegovina and it is expected to become more powerful when OHR 
closes and EU takes the lead for monitoring the country’s process toward European 
integration.97
Traditionally EU has mostly been characterized as a ‘civilian power’ which implies 
the use of diplomatic and economic tools rather than military force. It assisted Bosnia 
Herzegovina since 1996 in economic, governance, energy and infrastructure projects by 
providing support for sustainable economic development and preparing Bosnia-Herzegovina 
for EU integration. In addition, European Union provided around € 3 million in order to help 
Bosnia- Herzegovina develop its institutional capacity in formulating and implementing a 
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trade policy framework that promotes exports and foreign investments as well as brings 
sustainable development and economic growth. Similarly, EU has promoted regional 
economic development as well as reconstruction and rehabilitation in energy sector by 
investing almost € 4.5 million in it. 98 Progresses on these key issues do not only help BiH 
establish a framework that meets EU membership criteria but also make a direct impact on the 
standards of living for the whole population. 
As such, EU had also developed a normative aspect of its relations with Bosnia 
Herzegovina. The objective of the economic assistance was to push the country adopt reforms 
on human rights, democracy and the rule of law and encourage cooperation in the Balkan 
region which provides a framework for long-term solutions to the conflicts in it. Yet, 
according to some scholars, European Union has not been able to gain primary leadership in 
the region as actually United States has absorbed it since it favored the military intervention 
by NATO in 1995. 99
Therefore, the Butmir process, which was jointly initiated, organized and led by 
European Union and United States’ officials, integrated the long-term and softer EU power in 
the region with the United States tougher and short term power. 
Actually, while many Balkan states and people view the European Union as the most 
prominent framework to establish stabilization in the region, they are not sure about EU’s 
capability to realize reforms. In Bosnia, EU has lost some credibility among locals due to the 
long and tiring accession process which does not have clear strategies over the 
implementation and benefits of multiple stages.100 For instance, while EU signed the 
Stabilization and Association Agreement in 2008 although Bosnia-Herzegovina had not 
fulfilled all necessary conditions, it strictly stuck to its conditions regarding the visa 
liberalization. Apart from that, firstly,   EU did not approve visa liberalization for Bosnia 
although it had reached a comparable progress level; then it made visa liberalization policy 
dependent upon the developments in the Butmir process. The international mediators 
continuously warned local politicians that the success of Butmir talks would be linked to 
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potential EU visa liberalization for Bosnia. 101Yet, although the Butmir talks failed, in 
November 2010, the Council of European Union declared visa liberalization for Bosnia 
Herzegovina. This again demonstrates EU’s lack of clear strategies in the eyes of local parties 
in Bosnia in the implementation of multiple stages toward EU integration.
In addition, the ethnic parties in Bosnia are still unwilling to exchange their ethnic-
based autonomy for an EU perspective. In this context, the Serbian parties in Bosnia 
especially consider the EU agenda as a pretext to decrease the status of the autonomous 
Republica Srspska. Therefore, they refuse to undertake and implement reforms related to EU 
accession at the expense of their territorial or political authority.   102                                                                       
Regarding the role of United States in Bosnia, it has strongly supported Bosnia 
Herzegovina’s integration into Euro- Atlantic structure. Yet, although a strong and hard 
power in the whole region especially during the war years, the local parties perceive US 
impact as decreasing since 2004. Militarily, that is related with the fact that in 2004 NATO-
led political forces were replaced by the EU-led forces. Whereas politically, US were not 
effective enough in making the local parties accept constitutional reforms in2006. Apart from 
that, the plans to eliminate the OHR in which US diplomats play significant roles, signals 
further decline of US impact in BiH103.
As a matter of fact, the United States provided large amounts of aid to Bosnia in the 
first years after the war, however through time the total aids have been declining and 
nowadays the monetary amount is quite modest. The current US administration has allocated 
$53.474 million aid for Bosnia that will generally cover political and economic reforms and in 
more specific terms, the Foreign Military Finance (FMF) sector and Nonproliferation, 
Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs(NADR). 104
More importantly, United States has focused on strengthening state level institutions; 
thus its relationships with local ethnic parties in Bosnia have been shaped accordingly.  It 
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disagrees and criticizes Dodik’s opposition to a stronger central government and it openly 
advocates against the partition of Bosnia. The partition scenario would highly favorize the 
nationalist Serbs and Croats who believe they are not equally represented in the Bosnia-
Herzegovina entity and dissatisfy the Bosniaks who would lose the most in case this 
arrangement is realized. 105
Nevertheless, when looked at their past mediation experiences in post war Bosnia, 
both United States and European Union have failed so far in all initiatives undertaken to 
reconcile the local ethnic parties at the political level and realize the needed constitutional 
arrangements toward a centralized state system. In March 2006, although they managed to 
convince the leaders of major political parties to agree on some sort of constitutional 
amendments which were known as the ‘April Package’, the legislation was not approved by 
the needed two-thirds majority in the state parliament. 106 The proposal aimed to replace the 
three-member government presidency with a single presidency, strengthen the Bosnian state 
parliament and increase the powers of the prime minister. 
Similarly, the Prud process was another initiative undertaken by European Union and 
United States to bring together leaders of political parties and help resolve issues related to the 
constitutional amendment on the status of Brcko district and on the organization of population 
census in 2011.107However, the  Bosnian Muslim leader  Sulejman Tihic faced harsh criticism 
both within his own party of Democratic Action, SDA and the opposition. Thus the meetings 
were too vague but the international mediators saw them as the only platform that included 
representatives from three ethnic parties and that could resolve the disputes. However, the 
negotiations stopped after the Bosnian Central Government’ State Protection and 
Investigative Agency declared a document that alleged Dodik and many other officials of 
Republica Srspka to be corrupted. He, as a response demanded the other two leader s of the 
Bosniak and Croat entity to recognize the secession of Republica Srpska from Bosnia and said 
that he was considering to withdraw all officials of Republica Srska from central institutions 
and to hold referendum on independence. From that point, the talks lost any momentum they
had gained. 
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To conclude, European Union and United States remain the most powerful actors that 
can impact Bosnia economically, politically and militarily. In case the ethnic units in Bosnia 
show serious efforts for progress, both EU and US has much to offer. More importantly than 
all, through EU Bosnia can become part of the largest regional organization in Europe; 
whereas through US, it can gain legitimacy to become part of the largest militaristic 
organization that is NATO. Both would not only contribute to establish peace within the 
country but also improve foreign relations at a regional level and establish long term peace 
and sustainability. However, although they are powerful and influential actors in Bosnian 
politics, EU identity is often challenged due to its inability to fulfill the promises or grant the 
carrots on time. In addition, their past mediation experiences to maintain sovereignty through
constitutional arrangements have proved unsuccessful. While, sometimes they have been 
blamed from the Serbian entity for diminishing their highly autonomous territorial and 
political sphere, some other times they have been blamed from the Bosniak parties for 
bringing reforms that are not substantive enough. The Butmir Process was also associated by 
similar atmosphere and outcomes. 
5.4 Mediation Strategies 
Firstly, the Butmir Process, led by the joint initiative of EU/US with the aim of 
making changes to the state constitution of Bosnia Herzegovina and fulfilling the necessary 
conditions for the closure of OHR, was an ad hoc initiative with the main tendency of 
achieving instant solutions. EU and US mediation included leaders of the main political 
parties and did not include any representatives neither from the state and entity institutions 
nor from the local experts and non-governmental institutions. 
Positive outcomes from the talks in Butmir related to reforms toward a centralized 
state system were made a precondition for faster visa liberalization, EU candidate status and 
NATO Membership Action Plan. The EU representative, Carl Bildt, continuously repeated
that “Bosnia Herzegovina cannot get a free ticket to Europe” and that "If conditions for 
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participation in Euro-Atlantic integration are not met, Bosnia-Herzegovina will fall behind 
other countries in the region".108The mediators hoped that this message would reach to the 
citizens and they would pressure the local parties to react to the situation.
EU and US played a manipulative role in the negotiations by warning the immediate 
costs of losing the opportunities of EU and NATO memberships in case a solution to the 
current political stalemate was not achieved. In addition, they played a directive or substantive 
role by not simply facilitating the communication but by offering the reform package 
themselves. However, the political leaders of local parties were unsatisfied with the strategies 
followed and the proposals made by the mediators. According to Milorad Dodik, the talks 
were mainly directed towards principles rather than details of the constitutional reform, 
whereas the Croatian Representatives declared that the mediators offered a document that was 
too ambitious and almost unacceptable for all parties. According to him, in the beginning the 
negotiation process should have dealt with technical issues such as state property and 
conditions for visa liberalization and European integration and leave constitutional reforms 
for later as parties’ positions on that issue are very divergent. Apart from it, the leader of the 
Party for BiH; SBiH president Haris Silajdzic considered the process on the harm of 
democratic citizens of BiH since entity voting as the major problem in BiH was almost not 
mentioned in the package.109
Actually, although the Butmir Process was a good idea, the mediating actors seem 
unwilling to commit the amount of time and effort to conclude the process. At the moment 
that Dodik rejected the initial package, they quickly lowered the standards in order to make it 
more acceptable for him. However, this did not only impede the establishment of a more 
functional country but also opened the way to accommodate more extreme political options. 
The lack of clear strategies was also a result of the fact that the mediators had little to offer in 
exchange of reforms to those parties that would lose as a result of it.110
Apart from all these, the international mediators created a sense of emergency in 
Butmir by suggesting that extra-institutional and coercive means were necessary to change the 
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country’s political structure.  In other words, the mediator did not treat the issues as part of the 
BiH’s conflict dynamics but as requirements to be fulfilled in order to approach EU 
membership. 
To conclude, the EU/US mediation initiative was led by a high intervention strategy 
on substantive issues such as constitutional reforms and closure of OHR. The mediators 
offered a constitutional reform package to the negotiating parties which called for the 
establishment of a centralized state system as a precondition for the closure of OHR which is 
also a precondition for BiH accession to European Union. Lastly, it offered a ‘quick fix’ 
solution to the parties by giving a sense of emergency to the situation and suggesting coercive 
means to change the current political structure. Table Two summarizes all the discussions 
conducted in this chapter. 
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TABLE 2
Characteristics of the   Parties Nature of the Dispute
REGIME TYPE • Multi Party Regime
• Political Parties Polarized Along Ethnic Lines
DURATION AND TIMING OF INTERVENTION
• During October 2009
• Just Before the Elections in 2009
POWER STATUS
• No Power Differences
• No Singe Ethnic Power to Dominate National, Legal or Political 
Structures
INTENSITY OF THE DISPUTE
• Tens of Thousands of People have lost jobs
• A quarter of working population is unemployed
• 120.000 citizens continue to be internally displaced
RELATIONS WITH PARTIES  In a Stalemate TYPE OF ISSUES INVOLVED
• STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
• Constitutional Reform
• Division of State and      Defense Property
• Closure of OHR
Characteristics of the Mediators Mediation Strategies
POWER & RANK AND 
IDENTITY
• EU- The Most Influential Actor – Soft 
/Normative Power
• US- It’s Contribution Has Been Decreasing –
Hard Power
LOW INTERVENTION X
RELATIONSHIPS WITH 
PARTIES
 EU-Positive but Sometimes Blurry
US- Positive
MIDDLE INTERVENTION X
PREVIOUS  MEDIATION 
EXPERIENCES
 EU/ US – Failed ( April Package and Prud 
Process) HIGH INTERVENTION
 A combination of Carrots and Sticks ( EU & NATO 
integration)
 “Quick Fix” Strategy
BUTMIR PROCESS
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CHAPTER 6: CASE 2 – MEDIATION OF TURKEY 
In October 2009, the Turkish government initiated its own mediation efforts to ensure 
state sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia through a reconciliation process. Turkey’s 
interest in intervening in Bosnia was triggered by its concern toward the policies of EU that it 
perceived as favoring the Bosnian Serbs and ignoring the rights of Bosnian Muslims. In 
addition, it also criticized US for its unwillingness and lack of interest to deal with the 
problem of Bosnia Herzegovina.111
Turkey believed that the situation in Bosnia is deteriorating and the lack of consensus 
among political factors to revise the constitution that came out of Dayton Accord may get the 
country out of control. The threats for referendum from Republika Srpska and the Bosnian 
Croats’ increasing perception of seeing themselves part of separate entity have particularly 
worried Turkey and pushed it to start a consultation mechanism with the effort of reconciling 
the sides. 112
Firstly, Turkey started its mediation effort by an informal meeting between the 
Foreign Ministry of Turkey, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia which was held in Istanbul on 10 
October 2009 during the South East European Cooperation Process meeting. This meeting 
                                                            
111Yinanc B.2010. “Successful Turkish Mediation Puts Bosnia Back on Agenda”. Hürriyet Daily News.
http://gajerseys.com/n.php?n=bosnia-back-on-world-agenda-with-turkish-mediation-2010-05-23 , retrieved on 10 May 2011
112 Yinanc B.2010. “Excluded by US and EU, Turkey Undertakes Own Mediation in Bosnia” Hurriyet Daily News
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=excluded-by-us-and-eu-turkey-undertakes-its-onw-mediation-in-bosnia-2010-
01-15 , retrieved on 10 May 2011
59
was then followed by four other similar meetings until Abdullah Gül, Haris Silajdzic, and 
Boris Tadic, the presidents of Turkey, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia respectively, signed 
the Istanbul Declaration which guaranteed territorial integrity and sovereignty of BiH and 
called for peace, regional stability and economic development. 113
On a separate track, Turkey convened the foreign ministers of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Croatia to have their first trilateral meeting in Zagreb, in January 2010. On the one hand, 
the meetings would be repeated once every three months and on the other hand, the presidents 
of the three countries will meet separately on the sidelines of every international meeting. At 
the end of these meetings, Croatia voiced its strong support of Bosnia-s NATO membership 
aspirations. 
Therefore, Turkey has worked on two separate but parallel tracks which resulted in 
mutual calls for strong support of Bosnia Herzegovina’s territorial integrity and sovereignty 
and its aspirations toward EU and NATO membership. In addition, the three countries 
decided to launch common projects to sustain regional stability and economic development 
establishing new air, sea and land transportation routes. To conclude, this introduction part 
will be followed by a new section that will analyze the conditions of Turkey in mediating the 
Bosnian conflict according to the theoretical structure applied in the case of EU/US 
mediation. 
6.1 Characteristics of the Parties
Democratic regimes in Serbia and Croatia emerged in 2000s, after the fall of 
authoritarian regimes of the presidents Milosevic and Tjudman respectively. Since 1990s until 
now, Serbia changed its name and territory three times; therefore democratic regime building 
was strongly related with post-war reconstruction and state building.  Democratic transitions 
in both countries were characterized by the transition from war to peace, from command 
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economy to liberal market economy and from single party rule to pluralist democracy.114
Croatia’s transition was mostly influenced by the Milosevic factor, the Gorbachov factor as 
well as global collapse of communism in 1989. Yet, the appearing political elite were the one 
which shifted from the nomenclature into pluralized political elite. In other words, the old 
reformers continued their political life in a new plural context. 
Civil society remained one of the main factors that established democratic regimes in 
Serbia and Croatia. In each case of electoral breakthrough, the popularity of the authoritarian 
leader had declined significantly. Citizens were actively engaged in campaigns and voting and 
they were optimist about their ability to challenge the authoritarian rules.115  In addition, the 
transition was realized under the influence of internal resistance and pressure from below.
Although the changed party regime followed the ex communist model at a great 
extent, it is still possible to note some divergent points from the single party regime system. In 
addition, Croatia and Serbia which were the most authoritarian countries among all post-
communist states actually experienced dramatic democratic improvements after the elections 
in 2000. In the 2003 parliamentary elections in Serbia, there were presented around 20 
electoral lists with the participation of candidates from more than 50 political parties and 
organizations. Similar to that, the Croatian governmental system shift from a presidential 
system to a parliamentary one enabled the required democratic transition. In addition, the 
democratic transition established an autonomous political society with a party system and 
regular elections.116
The most influential exogenous factor that influenced regime change in Serbia and 
Croatia is European Union conditionality which is based on the fulfillment of the Copenhagen 
criteria as well as on full cooperation with International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). Now that the main perpetrators of Bosnian war,Radovan Karadžić and 
Ratko Mlladic have been captured, it may be argued that Serbia  has come closer to European 
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Union. However, the trials are still used by nationalist forces to show them as a victimization 
of Serbs and to radicalize Serbian politics. 117
Regarding Bosnia, the regime underwent a considerable change with the 
intensification of conflict and the outbreak of war. As it was already stated in the previous 
section, holding elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina is considered to be a priori as more than 
everything else; it supports the idea that the country’s political system holds elements of 
democracy. However, in practice, the electoral process obstructed the reconciliation process 
as the dominant political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina like the Party of Democratic 
Action (SDA), The Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ) etc, base 
most of their programmes on the protection of interests of their respective ethnicities.118
Whereas, the parties who have a state-wide political, social and economic programme like the 
Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), Social Democratic Party (SDP), Party for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH)etc  remained in the minority and they were unable to attract 
the majority of the people and establish sustainable political infrastructure.119 Therefore, 
political parties polarized along ethnic lines undertake narrow and sectarian reforms after they 
achieve electoral success and thus create conditions of group insecurity and mutual distrust. 
As a result, Bosnia-Herzegovina has been characterized by a burdensome decision-making 
process ruled by inefficient institutions. 
In terms of power status, through history Bosnia has been politically peripheral and 
caught between more powerful outer political forces. Firstly, at the end of the 19th century, the 
Croatian and Serbian nationalist movements fused into Bosnia after the decline of Ottoman 
Empire, with the single aim of absorbing it into a Greater Croatia or Greater Serbia. Secondly, 
Bosnia physically suffered the civil war of Yugoslavia in World War II. Thirdly, after the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, Bosnia was caught in the midst of a civil war due to the nationalist 
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propaganda war between Croatia and Serbia to dominate Yugoslavia and to attract their 
compatriots to their respective countries.120
Actually, nowadays Bosnia remains the weakest state when compared to Croatia and 
Serbia. It lacks a consolidated state structure as the international community still retains an 
extraordinary civilian and military presence with the positions of High Representative that 
oversees the implementation of civilian aspects of the government and EUFOR that assumes 
responsibility for military stabilization operations. 
Economically, Bosnia-Herzegovina was among the poorer areas of the old Yugoslav 
Federation and remains one of the poorer countries in Europe. The war damaged or destroyed 
most of the economy and infrastructure in Bosnia, caused the death of around 100.000 people 
and displaced half of the population. Privatization remains low and unemployment remains 
high as official rates tell about a 40% of unemployed people. Bosnia-Herzegovina’s economy 
is still regarded as a transition economy; as such it looks at EU membership as a driver to 
economic growth and development. 121
At the beginning of the 20th century, Serbia established itself as a regional military 
leader after leading a successful coalition of Montenegrin, Bulgarian and Greek troops to 
seize the remaining Ottoman controlled territories in Europe. Few years later, Serbia became 
the dominant partner in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes after the collapse of 
Austria-Hungary at the end of World War I. In addition, although the Federation of 
Yugoslavia, formed by the Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia, 
Croatia and Montenegro and the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina after the 
second World War to avoid Serbian domination; actually it were the Serbian Communists that 
ruled Yugoslavia’s political life. The Serbian communists were successful enough to 
transform the federation from an agrarian economy to an industrialized society. However, by 
the 1980s, the economy of Yugoslavia started to collapse. 
Starting from the 1980s until 2000s, Serbia engaged in several wars mostly with 
Kosovo and Bosnia but also with other countries of the federation that sought independence. 
Its president’s, Slobodan Milosevic, radical nationalism dragged the country toward the most 
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tremendous wars of the twenty-first century. Serbia suffered an area of mismanagement of its 
economy due to an extended period of international economic sanctions and damage to 
infrastructure and industry during the NATO strikes in 1999. 122
At the end of dark ages for Serbia, the economic progress became substantial but 
unemployment, high corruption and labor unrest remain the ongoing political and economic 
challenges of Serbia. However, as in the case of Bosnia, economic reform has been highly 
driven by the country’s aspiration to become member of European Union. Although, many 
sectors still need structural reforms, Serbia has managed to adopt modern legislations 
conform to EU and international standards in almost all areas of the economy. 
After Montenegro approved the referendum decision of separating from Serbia in June 
2006, Serbia declared itself as the continuity of the state union and retaining membership in 
all international organizations and institutions.123
Lastly, throughout history, Croatia moved from Hungarian authorities to Ottoman rule, 
from the Austrian monarchy to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. After the fall of 
communism in Europe, around 1990s, the country gained independence from the Yugoslav 
federation after a war conflict between the Croats and the Serbs. Finally, the permanent cease-
fire between the two was signed in the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995. 
The first progress of Croatia was noticed after 2000 in terms of implementing the 
Dayton Accord, regional cooperation, refugee returns, democratization and national 
reconciliation. It became a member of NATO in April 2009 and it is now in the final stage of 
EU accession negotiation which is expected to be concluded in June 2011. 
Economically, Croatia managed to rapidly industrialize and diversify its economy at 
the end of World War II and thus becoming one of the wealthiest of the Yugoslav Republics, 
however the economic infrastructure experienced massive damages as a result of the war. The 
economy grew strongly again after 2000 but several substantial challenges remain such as 
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unemployment, high foreign debts, finalization of the privatization process and many 
others.124
Therefore, none of the countries is a regional power and as such there does not exist a 
vast power difference among the three. Yet, when comparing their power status, it is clear that 
Bosnia- Herzegovina mainly remains behind. Croatia slightly leads by being a member of 
NATO and a candidate country for EU membership whereas the other two remain potential 
candidates. 125 In addition, Croatia remains active in the Balkan region by supporting its 
neighbors’ Euro-Atlantic progress and managing to deal some post-conflict issues such as the 
status of refugees displaced during the war years.  
As regard of the countries past relationships, before the 1990s, Croatia and Bosnia were 
members of the Yugoslav federation and Croatia’s rivalry was mainly directed towards 
Serbia. However the relations between Bosnia and Croatia deteriorated with the outbreak of 
war in Bosnia-Herzegovina due to the support of Croatia to the Bosnian Croat leadership. The 
rule of the authoritarian Franjo Tudjman brought the relationships to an even more dramatic 
situation as despite his recognition of the Bosnian government in Sarajevo in 1992; two years 
later, he supported the Bosnian Croats struggle against the same government. In addition, the 
Croatian state, led by him, failed to implement the requirements of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement although Croatia supported the formation of a Bosnian Muslim- Bosnian Croat 
Alliance at the end of the Bosnian war. 
Nevertheless, relationships mended after the elections in 2000 which were gained by Mesic 
who made his first foreign visit to Sarajevo and was welcomed as a friend of Bosnia
Herzegovina.126 In April 2010, Croatian President Ivo Josipovic apologized for crimes 
committed in Bosnia from 1992- 1995. In his speech he added: 
"I deeply regret that the Republic of Croatia contributed to it with its policy in the 1990s. I 
am deeply sorry that this policy contributed to the suffering of people and to the divisions 
which still affect us."127
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Therefore, the president’s speech signaled the beginning of a new era in terms of the 
relationships between Croatia and Bosnia by recognizing the mistakes from the past times and 
setting the stage for lasting peace, stability and prosperity toward a common European future. 
On the other side, the relationships between Serbia and Bosnia had their worst time during the 
war 1992-1995. The International Court of Justice charged Serbia with genocide against the 
Bosnian Muslims during the war years and found it in violation of international law for not 
preventing the Srebrenica massacre. In addition, although Serbia has signed the Dayton 
Agreement, which means respecting the territorial sovereignty and integrity of Bosnia 
Herzegovina, the Bosnian parts often blame the Serbian leaders for not doing anything to 
influence the Bosnian Serb leader, Milorad Dodik, to halt his actions that aim to undermine 
the effectiveness of Bosnia’s central government institutions.128
To conclude, Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia have passed a history of intense conflict where 
massive killings and destruction were recorded in three years war after Bosnians self 
declaration of independence. Nevertheless, after the war, the security has been established due 
to the presence of international actors (NATO, EUFOR); however relations are not still 
transformed into amicable ones. To conclude, it wouldn’t be proper to call the ethnic 
communities as historical adversaries as for a long time in history (both in Ottoman times and 
in Yugoslavia) they have co-lived and even shared the same nationality of being 
Yugoslavs129; despite that, relationships between the ethnic communities at the political level 
after the cease fire are mostly characterized to be in a stalemate.
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6.2 Nature of the Dispute
16 years after the Dayton Peace Negotiation was signed, Bosnia-Herzegovina still 
carries the burden of not having a stable and secure state structure.  Continuous debates on 
constitutional reforms have brought the country to a stalemate and diminished its prospects 
toward EU membership. As already stated in the previous chapter, the political deadlock 
spilled over to economic and refugee issues as well where a quarter of the population is 
recorded to be unemployed and tens of thousands still remain as internally displaced. In this 
context, Turkey initiated its mediation effort in October 2009 and the process has not finished 
yet. 
While the dissatisfaction of Bosnian Serbs and Croats with their respective positions 
within the state remains an important issue of the political impasse, lack of positive 
relationships between Bosnia-Herzegovina with Bosnian Serb and Croats’ respective kin 
states have deteriorated the situation130. Therefore, the main issue of the dispute within 
Turkey’s mediation context has been ensuring a permanent sovereignty and territorial 
integrity for Bosnia by improving the relationships of Bosnia with both Serbia and Croatia.
Related to it, the negotiation process firstly focused on the lack of a permanent 
recognition of the territorial integrity in Bosnia. Although Dayton Agreement which ended 
the war in Bosnia, is a supra-national settlement that was signed by both Croatia and Serbia, 
both countries were often blamed for not implementing the requirements of the Dayton 
Agreement and for not fully consolidating their position against actions taken by Bosnian 
Serbs and Croats in Bosnia to undermine the effectiveness of Bosnia’s territorial integrity and 
sovereignty. The Dayton Agreement mostly served to secure a temporary recognition of the 
territorial integrity of the country and it did not offer a permanent settlement to the ongoing 
conflicts playing out largely at the level of individual communities.131 Some consider Bosnia 
to experience its worst times since the end of the war because the failure to form a 
government since October elections directly attacked the legitimacy of state institutions. 
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Although violence does not seem to be imminent, the International Crisis Group evaluated the 
situation as a deep conflict in which violence would be a real prospect in the near future. 132  
In addition, the need to reaffirm the territorial integrity, sovereignty and legal identity of 
Bosnia Herzegovina became a central issue especially after the continuous threats of the 
Bosnian Serbs to hold a referendum on internationally imposed laws and central judicial 
bodies in Bosnia Herzegovina. 
Next, the legal arrangements that came out of the constitution in Bosnia ensure that no 
ethnic group dominates the national political structure. However, the constitution has created 
a paradox in itself by impeding the integration of the people of BiH and focusing on the 
ethnic composition Bosnia’s political structure. The fact that all main governing structures at 
the state level are created in tripartite schemes, consisting of one Bosniak, one Croat and one 
Serb, show that all members of the institutions defend the so- called vital interests of their 
respective ethnicity. Therefore, the legal identity of BiH became another important issue to be 
negotiated in the process of reconciliation mediated by Turkey.133
Apart from it, the Dayton Peace Accord did not include any arrangement for the 
reduction of armed forces and demobilization of ex-combatants. The main motives of the 
Dayton negotiators were to end the war and separate the parties as well as maintain a weak 
Bosnian State with two strong entities. Therefore, the agreement left the country without any 
concrete measurement on confidence-building and establishing sustainable peace.134 Although 
the parties signed a separate agreement on Confidence and Security Measures in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 1996, its framework included only measurements on armed forces and 
military agreements. However, confidence building includes also one of the key areas for 
capacity building in post-conflict countries necessary to establish trust, cooperation and 
solidarity between groups and communities as the basis for collective action. This does not 
only involve communication between members of a group but also dialogue between ethnic 
communities to accept, tolerate and reestablish contacts between ethnicities across political 
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and geographical spaces. 135 In this context, the mediation process laid special emphasis on 
the development of the relations between parties and establishing confidence. 
Furthermore, the eruption of violent ethnic conflicts following the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia undermined regional stability. The importance of Bosnia Herzegovina for the 
stability and security of the region does not only cover the Balkan Peninsula but the whole 
European continent. Given the ethnic composition of the country, its history and its relations 
with other neighboring countries show that Bosnia is pivotal to the stability in Europe. The 
international community has named the Dayton Accord as part of a work in progress and 
agrees with that the agreement did not function to establish a consolidated Bosnia-
Herzegovina but only to build up the Bosnian State. For that, the Butmir talks were an attempt 
to resolve this deficiency. For the same reason, Turkey considers regional stability as another 
important issue to be realized during the reconciliation process. To achieve it, Turkey 
suggested cooperating on areas of economy, energy, culture and environment.136
Last but not least, the reconciliation process mediated by Turkey focused on the issues 
of crimes and victims of war as well as Serbia’s policies toward Republika Srspska. Serbia’s 
policy toward Republika Srpska is also highly related with the issue of maintaining territorial 
integrity, sovereignty and legal identity of Bosnia Herzegovina.  Whereas, the lack of 
measures and lack of determination about resolving the issues of crime and victims of war 
would mean inability to cope with the past and to prosecute those responsible for war crimes. 
Showing commitment and achieving results on this issue would highly contribute to reduce 
the pain and provide some sort of proofs that the persons who committed crimes could not 
evade justice.137 In addition, the capture of war criminals was also an important step for 
Serbia to integrate into Euro-Atlantic Structures. Thus, Serbia’s membership in European 
Union and NATO would be an important step toward sustainable regional stability. 
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6.3 Characteristics of the Mediator 
Geographically, economically, politically and militarily, Turkey is without doubt 
important for all regions surrounding it. Turkey is almost equally effective in the Balkans, the 
Caucasus, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and the Middle East simultaneously. While 
Greece for instance can be a regional power for the Balkans or Russia a visible power in 
Central Asia and the Caucasus; they are hardly serious regional powers in the Middle East. 
Therefore, Turkey’s power largely stems in its strategic location. 138
Since the establishment of the modern Turkish Republic in 1922, Turkey’s political, 
economic and security have lied with the West. Turkey entered NATO in 1952 and it serves 
as one of the leading states in it by controlling the straits from the Black Sea to the Aegean 
and sharing borders with three main countries which are considered a threat for the West; 
Iran, Iraq and Syria. In addition, Turkey is one of the most powerful countries of the 
organization; firstly because it owns the largest military after that of USA. Secondly, NATO’s 
Air Component Headquarters are located in Izmir, Turkey and thirdly, Turkey took charge of 
a NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) command in Afghanistan in April 
2007.139 In addition, Turkish Navy is a regional naval power and that is working to develop 
capacities to project power beyond Turkey’s coastal waters.  Actually, all Turkish military 
structures are heavily involved in NATO, multinational and UN operations. 140
Besides its relationships with NATO, Turkey is a member of many other international 
organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the 
Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, UN and the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference. Turkey is also a member of World Trade 
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Organization and has many free agreements with European Free Trade Association and Israel. 
As the above range shows, Turkey has been willing to participate and cooperate with different 
multilateral and bilateral frameworks. 141
Turkey and EU relationship are not only understood as a foreign policy issue but also 
within a powerful domestic frame as well. Turkey’s power would highly increase by 
becoming a member of European Union, firstly because the country would receive certain 
economic benefits from EU membership and secondly because full membership in European 
Union would mean an irrevocable acceptance of Turkey’s European or Western nature142. 
The first bilateral relations between Turkey and EU have emerged in 1959 when the 
European Economic Community Council of Ministers accepts Ankara’s application for full 
membership. Four years after, Turkey and EEC sign the Ankara Agreement which secures 
Turkey’s full membership in the EEC through the establishment in three phases of a customs 
union. From this time on until the 1980’s, the two meet to draw out the detail of 
implementation of the agreement until the European Community decides to officially suspend 
the Ankara Agreement in January 1982 as a result of the military coup d’etat happening in 
Turkey on September 1980. Relations improved again in 1985 and reached their peak in 
October2005 when the accession negotiations started143
Currently, Turkey EU relationships are in a stalemate as 18 of the 33 areas of 
negotiation chapters are blocked and 8 chapters are frozen. Both the Turkish politician and 
Turkish public are highly dubious that European Union will ever grant membership to 
Turkey. While in 2002, European Union process was a central platform in the campaign of 
the governing Justice and Development Party, nowadays, politicians rarely mention it. In 
addition, pro EU demonstrations which were very widespread in 2004 are less common in 
Turkey nowadays.144
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After the 2000’s, Turkey adopted a new and more assertive foreign policy that does 
not diverge it from the West but does not either make United States and Europe the only 
concern for Turkey’s diplomacy. The drastic growth in Turkish economy has changed the 
focus of its foreign policy as well. Currently, Turkey is known to experience the greatest 
economic growth in Europe and to be the third country with the highest economic growth in 
the world. Per capita incomes have increased three fold within not even a decade and foreign 
direct investment flows have increased 20 folds. Therefore, one of the main components of 
Turkish foreign policy becomes the economic aspirations to get new export markets and 
receive more foreign direct investments. 145
Turkey’s power is increasing through a number of different initiatives as well.  The 
country has developed a number of connections throughout the region by playing a 
constructive role in Middle East peace process and by convincing along with Brazil, Iran to 
sign some commitments related to its nuclear program as well. Turkey’s increasing influence 
in the world has been shown also when it was elected to the United Nations Security Council 
after 47 years with the votes of 150 countries out of 190 countries in total.  Apart from it, 
Turkey has made itself visible in world politics due to its engagements in many mediation 
efforts between Syria and Israel, Afghanistan and Pakistan, different groups in Lebanon and 
in the Balkans. Lastly, it has asserted its presence through a large amount of humanitarian aid 
that is delivered in 98 different countries of the world.  146
Apart from the domestic economic and political patterns, Turkey’s international 
relationships have been highly dependent upon the way its identity has been perceived by the 
international actors.  As a matter of fact, the modern identity of Turkey has almost been 
framed according to three main pillars: secularism, nationalism and republicanism. In the 
Turkish model, secularism meant restriction of public religious practices to the minimum. 
Nationalism was highly related to accepting all citizens of Turkey as Turkish rather than 
labeling them according to their ethnicity. Lastly, republicanism referred to the role of state 
and army in economic and social affairs. This frame has often changed through the modern 
history of the Turkish Republic however the tradition has mostly been challenged by the 
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currently governing Justice and Development Party (JDP). 147 While it accepts the secular and 
republican framework of the constitution, it argues that secularism must be limited to 
separating mosque and state in a way that allows neither to interfere in the practices of the 
other. Apart from it, the AKP has taken a hard-line position towards the militant and 
secessionist Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), which it accuses of terrorism. But it allowed 
Kurdish language to be used in the media and schools, by thus distinguishing between 
peaceful Kurdish and the secessionist ones. In addition, these kinds of measures can bring 
Turkey in line with European Union positions on minorities and civil rights.
As a matter of fact, since the 1990s, many new independent states of Central Asia and 
Central Europe saw in Turkey a model country of a democratic, secular and free market 
society. Actually, although Turkey owns a successful experience in building a modern nation 
on the remains of an old empire and advancing to a pluralist democracy with a market 
economy and a secular state, many pointed to Turkey’s own domestic problems and its 
inability to export this model outside. Yet, it still remained as a “big brother” to Turkic people 
in the world and especially to the Muslim population in the Balkans. 148
Thus, this perception of identity has also influenced a lot the relations between Turkey 
and Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia; although this was not the only factor that build up their 
relations.  Bosnia Hezergovina has been one of the countries which had a privileged place on 
the Turkish Foreign Policy Agenda mostly due to its deep historical, cultural and social 
bonds. Turkish Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdogan declared that relations between the two 
countries have always been excellent and that the driving force stemmed from very close ties 
between the people of the two countries. 149  The situation of the Muslim population of Bosnia 
Herzegovina during the civil war that was followed by Bosnia’s declaration of independence 
in 1992 gave rise to popular sympathy in Turkey and support for policies to intervene to help 
the Bosnian Muslims. Although Turkey supported international actions such as the UN 
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peacekeeping forces and the role of NATO to enable peace, it disagreed with the ways the 
actions were implemented. However, Turkey never took unilateral actions in Bosnia. 150
After Dayton Accord was signed, Turkey has contributed to the reconstruction of 
Bosnia Herzegovina by actively supporting the implementation of the civilian and military 
reforms of the agreement which ended the war.  More concretely, as a member of the steering 
board, it joins the work of the Implementation Council and it contributes to the European 
Union peacekeeping operation named Althea. 151 Throughout years, Turkey has supported the 
re-establishment of the multi-ethnic, multi- cultural status of Bosnia Herzegovina through 
maintenance of its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within the 
internationally recognized borders. 
Apart from the political sphere, Turkey- Bosnia relations have developed at the 
economic and trade areas as well.  Turkey has financially supported the reconstruction of 
Bosnia Herzegovina by pledging over 100 million dollars. The Turkish companies helped in 
reconstructing the houses, factories, hospitals and the infrastructure of the region after the 
war. In addition, since 9 years the two have signed the Free Trade Agreement. 152
Furthermore, Turkey supports Bosnia- Herzegovina through numerous projects and 
activities implemented by the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) in a 
wide range of fields including education, health, economy and culture.  Although TIKA is 
present in many other countries in the Balkans, in 2006, Bosnia Herzegovina was the first in 
receiving the highest amount of aid which went to 25.19 million USD.153
Lastly, Turkey supported Bosnia- Herzegovina’s integration with Euro- Atlantic 
institutions including NATO membership and EU accession. It has continuously asserted that 
a permanent stability in Europe would be impossible without a permanent stability in Bosnia 
Herzegovina. Moreover, as one of the most potential actors in NATO, Turkey advocates 
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Bosnia’s integration in NATO as a path to strengthen cooperation and move jointly toward 
solving sensitive issues.154
Actually, Turkey’s support to integrate into Euro- Atlantic countries goes for all 
Balkan countries in order to unite the whole region until a united umbrella and make up a 
better future. In this understanding, Turkey and Croatia have shared common goals such as 
integration in Euro- Atlantic structures, regional cooperation and establishment of peaceful 
relations.  Since both countries are candidates for EU membership, they share their 
experiences with each other. 155
Even though Turkey and Croatia have different geographic and strategic positions and 
belong to different cultural spheres, their bilateral relations have always been developed. High 
level visits between the countries have taken place regularly without interruption since the 
establishment of relations. 156  In 1994, the president of Turkey, Suleyman Demirel, would 
declare that:
“Historically our people share heritage and geography. History is born through mutual ties 
and cultural influences. It is therefore natural that our countries nurture the feeling of respect, 
love and friendship for each other. If to this already favorable climate we add modern 
possibilities and joint will, I believe that we shall promote Turkish-Croatian friendship and 
cooperation very soon.”157
As such,  Turkey applied a constructive approach in mediating the conflict between 
Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims by supporting Croatia’s efforts to bring them closer 
together and establish the federation of Bosnia- Herzegovina within the Washington 
agreement and by developing a system of tri-lateralism that would further their relations. The 
positive experience spilled over to the economic sphere in which the relations achieved a peak 
through the Free Trade Agreement signed in 2002 that covered agricultural and non 
agricultural products, protection of competition, trade in services and regulation of the 
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intellectual property. 158  The last agreement of this type reached among the two until now 
aimed to boost economic and commercial relations and raise the trade volume to one billion 
euros by the end of 2013159. 
However, as already mentioned above, Turkey had stronger relations with countries 
which owned a majority of Muslim population like Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo etc. Whenever a 
conflict took place around Turkey in the former Ottoman lands, Turkey became a target of 
migration especially for the Muslims of the region which regarded it as a second homeland. 
Due to the warm attitudes especially between the Bosnian Muslims and the Turkish people, 
Mlladic, the commander of Milosevic, regarded the Muslims of Bosnia as Turks. Even in the 
Serbian nationalist marches, the Bosnian Muslims are referred to as Turks.  For this purpose, 
Serbia always opposed the idea of sending Turkish troops in the Balkans.160  Turkey Serbia 
relations were highly problematic during the Bosnian war from 1992- 1995 in which Turkey 
strongly supported the NATO decision to deploy a naval force to monitor the economic 
sanctions against Serbia. Apart from it, Turkey used its entire military and diplomatic means 
to persuade the UN permanent members to adopt an action plan that included limited air 
strikes against Serbia. Furthermore, Turkey was even reported to covertly supply arms to the 
Bosnian Muslims via Croatia, although nothing official appeared out. Apart from these, 
Turkey supported the NATO actions against Serbia in the Kosovo war. In May 1999, the 
United States demanded to use the air base in Turkey as a tool to make pressure on the Serbs 
although it was not needed in the war.161 Moreover, Turkey – Serbia relations were strained 
again in 2008 when Turkey became one of the first countries to recognize the independence of 
Kosovo from Serbia.162
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Despite the past tensions, Turkey recognizes the central importance of Serbia to 
establish peace and stability in the troubled regions of the Balkans. The Turkish ambassador 
in Serbia would declare in an interview that “Serbia is the key western Balkan country, 
without which no peace and stability can happen. And if you want war, you need Serbia 
again!”163 Serbia is located in a very strategic position in the Balkans and it serves to be the 
shortest way between Turkey and Western Europe. As such, Serbia remains a very important 
transit country for the Turkish goods and people. In this understanding, politically Turkey 
supports Serbia’s integration into Euro- Atlantic structures and economically it is being 
prepared to increase investments especially after the Free Trade Agreement was signed in 
2009. 
To conclude, past relations of Turkey with Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia have developed 
in different ways. Turkey has always been firmed in recognizing the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of Bosnia and has developed a foreign policy which supported that aim. Even 
until recently, relationships with the other countries, Croatia and Serbia were built according 
to that framework. Therefore, Turkey experienced a lot of tensions with both countries when 
they refused to recognize the independent Bosnia and improved relationships with them when 
they changed positions toward advocating a sovereign and independent Bosnia. The final 
encompassing goal of Turkey is to have the three countries united in permanent peace and 
stability within the umbrella of NATO and EU. 
6.4 Mediation Strategies
Turkey’s initiative to mediate the conflict in Bosnia was based on the main assumption 
that the region’s stability depends on the consolidation of Bosnia Herzegovina. The active 
foreign policy of Turkey in the Balkan region was part of Turkey’s Foreign Minister, Ahmet 
Davutoglu’s overall policy of “zero problems with the neighbors”. 
                                                            
163 “Interview: Turkish Ambassador to Serbia”. 2010. http://serbianna.com/analysis/archives/555, retrieved on 30 May 2011 
77
The first mechanism that Turkey applied as a mediator in the post- Dayton Bosnia 
conflict has been initiating many meetings between the leaders of the three countries. A result
of this initiative was the formation of Trilateral Consultation Mechanisms: Turkey- Bosnia 
and Hezregovina- Serbia and Turkey- Bosnia and Herzegovina – Croatia. The meetings 
between Turkey, BiH and Serbia started in 10 October 2009 in Istanbul during the South East 
European Cooperation Process meeting and they were followed by two other consecutive 
meetings in November and December respectively; one after the Standing Committee for 
Economic and Commercial Cooperation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and 
the other during the conference of the Alliance of Civilizations for Southeast Europe. 
Turkey organized the first stage of improving relations to be the resolution of 
diplomatic tensions. As such, the fourth meeting of the same format organized in Belgrade on 
January 2010 resulted with an agreement between BiH and Serbia in which BiH had decided 
to appoint its ambassador in Serbia. The lack of direct political relations between the 
countries was because there was no Bosnian ambassador in Serbia and the appointment would 
act as a start for good neighbor relations. 164
The fifth trilateral meeting which this time was organized by the heads of the states in 
February 2010 in Ankara resulted with signing the Istanbul Declaration which guaranteed 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of BiH and called for peace, regional stability and 
economic cooperation. The countries agreed on a common vision based on the pillars of 
security for all, high level political dialogue, economic interdependence and preservation of 
multi-ethnic, multi- cultural and multi-religious social composition of the region165  
Furthermore, Serbia undertook an important step in the direction of reconciliation 
between the people of BiH and Serbia by approving a resolution on March 2010 apologizing 
for the Srebrenica Massacre in 1995. It expressed sympathy to the victims and apologized for 
not doing enough to prevent the massacre. Apart from it, Serbia’s president Boris Tadic even 
paid an official visit to Bosnia Herzegovina accompanied by Turkey’s Prime Minister 
Erdoğan, to attend the ceremony commemorating the 15th anniversary of the Srebrenica 
Massacre in Bosnia Herzegovina. Turkish officials in this case applied a very low intervention 
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policy in trying to help the two sides reach an understanding over the content of the apology. 
The reason behind that is that any pressure from a foreign country in this issue would not 
work. 166
In a similar format, Turkey organized tri-lateral meetings between Turkey, BiH and 
Croatia. Their first trilateral meeting was organized in January 2010 and it was agreed to be 
repeated every three months. In addition, the heads of the three states would meet in every 
international meeting they attended.  These meetings resulted with an agreement announcing 
that Turkey and Croatia supports BiH’s unity and its aspirations to become a member of 
international organizations. To realize it, Turkey and Croatia supported on its Membership 
Action Plan which is a prerequisite to full membership in NATO.  The Foreign Minister of 
BiH considers the support of both countries as extraordinary and declares that getting the 
Membership Action Plan wouldn’t be possible without the constant and active support of 
Turkey and Croatia. 167
Dialogue of this type is expected to remain on two separate tracks. In other words, 
Turkey kept both mechanisms as separate through parallel tracks in order to run things
smoothly, although the foreign ministers of the three countries advocated the view to merge 
the tracks. 
Apart from it, Turkey worked to expand cooperation with Serbia Croatia and BiH on 
diplomatic and economic levels. After the trilateral meetings, Turkey and Serbia signed six 
agreements including the free visa travel agreement, cooperation in the construction sector 
and they reviewed their military, cultural and administrative relations. They also held several 
talks on selling Serbia’s main airline (JAT Airways) which is in crisis to Turkish Airline. 
Lastly, Turkey is undertaking projects to help develop the infrastructure in the Sandzac area 
which is a province in Serbia populated with Muslims. Apart from that, the foreign ministers 
of Turkey and Serbia promoted reconciliation between the two leaders of the most important 
local parties in Sandzac. Similarly, Turkey promoted a boost of economic and commercial 
relations with Croatia by agreeing to raise the trade volume between the two countries to one 
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billion euro by the end of 2013.168 A primary target was also to promote economic relations 
with BiH and to boost its trade volume.  An example of cooperation between the two 
countries was realized between Turkish Airlines and BiH Airlines which noted the first 
partnership of Turkish Airlines outside Turkey.
To conclude, as already noted above, the main strategy of Turkey was to develop 
confidence – building measures and discuss issues not only from a trilateral perspective i.e. 
relations between BiH, Serbia and Croatia but from a regional perspective as well.  This was 
also shown in how Turkey used its one- year chairmanship of the South East European 
Cooperation Process as a regional framework for its tri-lateral consultation mechanism. 169 In 
addition, Turkey’s mediation targets BiH stability as a necessary measure not only for BiH 
itself but for Europe as well. As Turkey’s President would declare: “We believe that the 
Balkans is not at the end of Europe, but that is the heart of Europe”.170
Below, we will provide Table three that summarizes all the discussion done in this 
chapter on the mediation of Turkey.
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TABLE 3/A
Characteristics of the   Parties Nature of the Dispute
REGIME TYPE
• Multi Party Regime 
(In Serbia& Croatia- after 2000)
• (In BiH)Political Parties Polarized Along Ethnic 
Lines
DURATION AND TIMING OF 
INTERVENTION
• Since October 2009 (continuing)
• Before elections ( BiH) 
POWER STATUS • A Small Power Difference
INTENSITY OF THE DISPUTE
• Tens of Thousands of People have lost 
jobs
• A quarter of working population is 
unemployed
 120.000 citizens continue to be internally 
displaced
RELATIONS WITH 
PARTIES
 In a stalemate 
TYPE OF ISSUES INVOLVED
• Permanent Recognition of  BiH’s 
territorial integrity,   sovereignty and legal 
identity
• Improving Relation  (Confidence 
Building)
• Resolving the issue of war crimes and 
victims of war 
• Cooperation and regional stability
THE MEDIATION OF TURKEY
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TABLE 3/B
Characteristics of the Mediators Mediation Strategies
POWER & RANK 
AND IDENTITY
• Turkey- A rising power
LOW INTERVENTION Facilitation and Consultation Mechanisms
RELATIONSHIPS 
WITH PARTIES
 Turkey – Bosnia ( Excellent)
 Turkey – Croatia (Positive since Turkey 
mediated the conflict between Bosnian Croats 
and Bosnian Muslims and after the fall of 
Tudjman authoritative regime.
 Turkey- Serbia ( Negative in the Bosnian War  
and Kosovo War and strained when Turkey 
recognized the independence of Kosovo)
MIDDLE INTERVENTION X
PREVIOUS  
MEDIATION 
EXPERIENCES
 The mediation between the Bosnian Croats and 
Bosnian Muslims during the Bosnian War
HIGH INTERVENTION X
THE MEDIATION OF TURKEY
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CHAPTER 7: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION
7.1 Mediation Outcome
Based on the literature review on mediation success, we reaffirm that the Butmir 
Process was unsuccessful and produced no result whereas the mediation conducted by Turkey 
produced successful outcomes in several aspects. For instance, the mediation was successful 
in reaching several agreements and improving the relations between parties.  Abdullah Gül, 
Haris Silajdzic, and Boris Tadic, the presidents of Turkey, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia 
respectively, signed the Istanbul Declaration which guaranteed territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of BiH and called for peace, regional stability and economic development. 171 The 
declaration succeeded in clarifying the issues of BiH’s territorial integrity and sovereignty 
which was temporarily established in the Dayton Accord.  
Next, relations improved at the political and diplomatic level especially after it was 
agreed that BiH would appoint its ambassador to Serbia and after the Serbian Parliament 
adopted the Declaration of Srebrenica by which it officially apologized for its role in the 
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Massacre in 1995.172 The last factor helped also to reestablish trust between the parties and 
motivate them to adopt a more cooperative orientation.
Lastly, the mediation made a great difference to settling the dispute but since this is an 
elusive concept to measure success we are not using it. In addition, we cannot say much 
whether the pre-mediation goals were fulfilled or whether stability and wisdom is established 
because the mediation started only two years ago and actually it is not finished yet; therefore 
we need to wait for some other years to analyze it. 
Now, the above analyzes of the two mediation cases led by EU/US and Turkey 
respectively aimed to provide the main features underlying the conflict background,
characteristics of the parties, characteristics of the mediator and mediation strategies that build 
up the mediation process in each case. To serve the purpose of this study, the last section will 
compare the findings that came out from each case and match them with the presented 
theoretical framework in order to draw out important remarks on what made one mediation 
more successful than the other.
7.2 Characteristics of the Parties
As already in chapter five, since the Dayton Accord that affirmed BiH territorial 
integrity and sovereignty, the country’s political system is characterized by regular elections 
as one of the main political priorities; therefore this shows that each ethnic group is 
represented by more than two parties. However, in practice, the electoral process obstructed 
the reconciliation process as the dominant political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina like the 
Party of Democratic Action (SDA), The Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (HDZ) etc, base most of their programmes on the protection of interests of their 
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respective ethnicities.173 Whereas, the parties who have a state-wide political, social and 
economic programme like the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), Social 
Democratic Party (SDP), Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH)etc  remained in the 
minority and they were unable to attract the majority of the people and establish sustainable 
political infrastructure.174 On the other side, the mediation conducted by Turkey included the 
countries of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia which currently are all organized by democratic 
features; however prior to 2000, Serbia and Croatia belonged to more authoritarian regimes. 
Nevertheless, at the time of mediation, both ethnic groups in Bosnia and the states of Serbia 
and Croatia were featured by multi party regimes. As the literature on determinants of 
mediation outcome demonstrates, multi party regimes are generally more successful than 
those involving other regime types and the one-party state dyads are the least successful in 
mediation attempts.175
Next, we conclude that in both cases the power difference between the negotiating 
parties was small or almost zero. In the case of the EU/US mediation, the constitution that 
came out of the Dayton Accord aimed to preserve ethnic identity and ensure that no single 
ethnic power would dominate national, legal or political structures. Whereas, in the case of 
the mediation of Turkey, the power difference was very small in which, among the three 
countries, Bosnia-Herzegovina seems to remain behind due to the lack of a consolidated state 
structure and poor economy and infrastructure highly destroyed during the war and Croatia 
slightly leads by being a member of NATO and a candidate country for EU membership and 
due to its progress in managing post-conflict issues. However, it is important to keep in mind 
that none of the countries is a regional power therefore the second criteria established by the 
literature review that the smaller the power differences between the adversaries, the greater 
the effectiveness of international mediation seemed to be fulfilled in both cases as well, 
although in the EU/US mediation it is more consolidated. 
Thirdly, in both cases the relations between parties were in a stalemate. As presented in 
chapter five, the ethnic parties are characterized by negative relations at the political level 
                                                            
173 European Parliament Directorate General External Policies of the Union Policy Department. 2007. “ The Constitutional 
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175 Bercovitch J. Anagson Th. and Wille D.L. 1991. “ Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of 
Successful Mediation in International Relations. Journal of Peace Research. 28: 1. p.10
85
however at the public level, the older people have more friends from different nationalities 
and younger people show higher preferences for mixed friendship. This demonstrates that 
throughout generations, people have either lived in mixed communities or are eager to do that 
in the future. 176 Yet, the past relations of the ethnic parties originating after the end of the war 
have historically been negative.
         Similarly, BiH, Croatia and Serbia have passed a history of intense conflict in the past 
where massive killings and destruction were recorded in three years after Bosnians self 
declaration of independence. After that, the relationships have mostly been negative or remain 
in a stalemate as no agreement or political dialogue existed between parties. Therefore, 
although the relationship should not be targeted as historical adversaries, it remained negative. 
Therefore as according to the literature, the probability of successful mediation is higher when 
mediating between friends and lower when mediating between historical adversaries, this is 
one of the determinants that should have hardened the mediation process. Table Four can also 
help us to note the similarities between the two cases. In other words, although the parties 
were not the same, their characteristics were almost so. 
TABLE 4 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PARTIES
REGIME TYPE POWER STATUS RELATIONS WITH 
PARTIES
EU/US MEDIATION
( THE BUTMIR 
PROCESS)
Multi- Party No Power 
Differences
In a stalemate 
THE MEDIATION 
OF TURKEY
Multi- Party A Small Power 
Difference
In a stalemate
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7.3 Nature of the Dispute 
Both mediations started in October 2009 and both mediations initiated after the 
conflict passed several phases. First, the conflict in the case mediated by EU/US has passed 
several phases before this mediation took place and thus it fulfills one argument shared by all 
scholars that claims the need for a minimum amount of time to pass before mediation 
becomes successful.  However, what Druckman (1993; 1994) Touval and Zartman (2001) 
would declare about the need for the parties to be at the stage of revaluating their policies was 
not taken into consideration as mediation took place just before the electoral campaigns in 
which parties were actually consolidating their nationalistic positions to increase the support 
for their electorate rather than reevaluating their policies in order to create space for 
compromise. 
Similarly, the mediation conducted by Turkey was undertaken at a time when 
continuous debates on constitutional reforms had brought the country to a stalemate, thus 
respecting the condition put by scholars on the need to pass some ‘tests of strength’ between 
parties before initiating a mediation. In other words, the situation was at a stalemate and lack 
of progress could highly risk not only BiH domestic stability but also BiH and Serbia’s future 
toward Euro- Atlantic integration. 
Next, in none of the cases we can measure any fatality according to Bercovich 
operationalization177, but the conflict caused loss of jobs for tens of thousands of people as a 
result of failure to ensure cooperation and fiscal coordination. In addition, quarter of working 
population resulted as unemployed and the other remaining majority gained low salaries and 
pensions. Apart from that, the political deadlock has also blocked the resolution of the refugee 
issue; as such 120, 000 citizens continue to be considered as internally displaced. 178
Similarly, the continuous dispute slowed the process of Euro- Atlantic integration and thus 
                                                            
178 Office of High Representative  in Bosnia. 2009.  “Amid ‘Political Impasse’, Bosnia and Herzegovina at Crossroads in Bid 
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detained economic and political benefits which would be given through free access to 
Europe’s largest market and through direct and regular contact with Europe’s greatest powers. 
Therefore, what scholars argue that the mediation will be accepted and be more successful if 
the intensity of the dispute is greater does not hold.  Yet, the successful mediation of Turkey 
supports Brockner (1982), Burton (1969) and Modelski (1964) who claim that the greater the 
intensity, the higher the losses, the more polarized the parties’ positions will become and so 
more will the parties want to “win at all costs”. 
Lastly, both mediators aimed to ensure state sovereignty and prevent territorial 
integrity threatened by the political deadlock. Yet, the dispute issues they selected to achieve 
the goal were different.  The Butmir Process targeted the issues of constitutional change and 
centralization of state system, closure of Office of High Representative as well as separation 
of state and military properties. This meant that any meaningful constitutional change would 
require reformulating the country’s power structures by making each ethnic party concede 
some of its autonomy for the sake of more centralized institutions. According to Dodik, at the 
beginning, the negotiation process should have dealt with technical issues such as state 
property and conditions for visa liberalization and European integration and leave 
constitutional reforms for later as parties’ positions on that issue are very divergent. 
However, the Turkish mediation, focused on the issues of confidence- building 
regional stability, cooperation on areas of economy, energy, culture and environment as well 
as the issues of crimes and victims of war. As it clearly noted, the Butmir Process failed to 
cover the intangible issues define by Lewicki and Litterar (1985) and focused simply on 
tangible issues and thus reaffirmed the argument that often, intangible issues, although not 
listed in the formal agenda, may be more important than tangible issues and if the mediator 
does not pay attention to them, they may trigger rigid positions and hostile behaviors and thus 
bring the process to a deadlock. Differently from it, the Turkish mediation dealt with both 
tangible issues such as sovereignty, territorial integrity and legal identity of BiH and 
intangible issues such as confidence building and war crimes in order to increase trust and 
cooperation among parties and enable a positive belief that those who commit crimes cannot 
evade justice.179
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  On the other hand, Bercovitch and Ott claims that mediations involving topics of 
ideology and security respectively are hardly negotiable whereas issues of sovereignty are 
more resolvable were reaffirmed by the Turkish case.
Apart from it, what made the Turkish mediation more successful than the EU/US 
attempt was the lack of complex issues. To clarify it more, according to Moore (1986) 
mediations are more manageable if issues are not complex. In other words, more complex the 
dispute is, less are the chances for an effective mediation. 180 Although the Turkish mediation 
had multiple issues to resolve in the agenda, each issue was complementing the other. For 
instance, a permanent recognition of sovereignty, territorial integrity and legal identity of BiH 
together with captures of war crimes and recognition of war atrocities trigger trust and build 
confidence among states and ethnic communities. Once , trust is established, the number of 
cooperative agreements in the fields of economy, environment, energy etc increase and once 
the number of cooperative agreements increase, regional stability is enhanced. Lastly, 
regional stability means quicker integration to Euro- Atlantic structures.
Whereas in the case of the Butmir process, inclusion of OHR which was not present 
physically in the mediation process, as an integral part of the talks damaged its credibility as a 
neutral actor and complicated the negotiations. Apart from it, the representatives of Republica 
Srpska were more open to negotiations on state and military properties since that would bring 
the closure of the OHR as well but they showed strong resistance to the fulfillment of 
constitutional reforms which in fact to them meant losing some sovereignty. However, the 
main Bosniak parties (Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina , SBiH, and Social Democratic 
Party,SDP) considered the Office of High Representative  as their main negotiating leverage 
and they did not agree  to fulfill the objectives that required its closure until the constitutional 
reforms are completed 181Therefore, complexity in terms of contradicting outcomes triggered 
a deadlock in the process.
To conclude, both EU/US and Turkey worked on the issue of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity and they initiated the mediation process in the same month. However, 
Turkey became more successful because the issues were selected to resolve the dispute were 
                                                            
180 Moore, C. 1986. The mediation process. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass
181 International Crisis Group. 2011. “Bosnia: Europe’s Time to Act”. Europe Briefing. 51.  
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/bosnia-herzegovina/B059-bosnia-europes-time-to-act.aspx , retrieved 
on 10 May 2011. p. 1
89
not complex and touched both the tangible and intangible dimensions. Table Five will 
summarize the relationship of these determinants with the mediation outcome. 
TABLE 5 
NATURE OF THE DISPUTE
DURATION & 
TIMING OF 
INTERVENTION
INTENSITY OF 
THE DISPUTE
TYPE OF ISSUES 
INVOLVED
EU/US 
MEDIATION
( THE BUTMIR 
PROCESS)
October 2009
Before Elections in 
BiH
Middle SOVEREIGNTY + 
TANGIBLE ISSUES
COMPLEX ISSUES
THE MEDIATION 
OF TURKEY
Since October 2009
(continuing)
Before Elections in 
BiH
Middle Sovereignty + 
Tangible and 
Intangible Issues
COMPLEMENTARY
ISSUES
7.4 Characteristics of the Mediator 
When looking at both cases, European Union is the most impartial actor in the process 
as even during the war it did not engage in any activity against any of the parties. It 
established its civilian and military presence in Bosnia only after the Dayton Accord was 
signed and functioned to ensure security and keep stability. On the other hand, neither U.S nor 
Turkey has saved this characteristic. Both of them openly advocated their support to BiH 
territorial integrity and undertook military actions against Serbia after the Srebrenica 
massacre. Yet, Turkey is perceived to be less impartial as it was often regarded as a “big 
brother” to Turkic people in the world and especially to the Muslim population in the 
Balkans. In addition, Turkey became a target of migration especially for the Muslims of the 
90
region which regarded it as a second homeland and due to the warm attitudes especially 
between the Bosnian Muslims and the Turkish people, Mlladic, the commander of Milosevic, 
regarded the Muslims of Bosnia as Turks. Even in the Serbian nationalist marches, the 
Bosnian Muslims are referred to as Turks. However, the perceived partiality did not count 
much on the Turkish mediation. Therefore, what Young (1967), Jackson (1952) and 
Northedge & Donelan (1971) argue about impartiality as an attribute which remains at the 
heart of successful mediations in many situations, does not hold in the case of Turkey.
EU’s biggest asset that makes it an influential actor in these types of mediations is its 
ability to offer access to Europe’s greatest organization that is European Union. Once , a 
country is member of EU, it enjoys economic benefits by getting access to one of the largest 
markets of the world; political privilege by engaging in political dialogue with many powerful 
countries on a daily basis but also greater opportunities for cultural interactions due to free 
visa regimes. However, through US, the country could gain legitimacy to become part of 
NATO, the largest Western militaristic organization. Both would not only contribute to 
establish peace within the county but also improve foreign relations at a regional level and 
establish long term peace and sustainability. 
As regards to Turkey, after the Dayton Accord was signed, it offered to BiH aid for 
reconstruction, military and civilian support as well as cooperation opportunities in many 
fields such as economy, environment, culture and health. Similar projects were implemented 
in Serbia and Croatia as well. For instance, it contributed to the reconstruction of Bosnia 
Herzegovina by actively supporting the implementation of the civilian and military reforms of 
the agreement which ended the war.  More concretely, as a member of the steering board, it 
joins the work of the Implementation Council and it contributes to the European Union 
peacekeeping operation named Althea. 182 Throughout years, Turkey has supported the re-
establishment of the multi-ethnic, multi- cultural status of Bosnia Herzegovina through 
maintenance of its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within the 
internationally recognized borders. 
Apart from the political sphere, Turkey- Bosnia, Turkey- Serbia and Turkey- Croatia 
relations have developed at the economic and trade areas as well.  Turkey has financially 
supported the reconstruction of Bosnia Herzegovina by pledging over 100 million dollars. 
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The Turkish companies helped in reconstructing the houses, factories, hospitals and the 
infrastructure of the region after the war. In addition, since 9 years the two have signed the 
Free Trade Agreement. 183 Furthermore, Turkey signed the Free Trade Agreement with 
Croatia in 2002 that covered agricultural and non agricultural products, protection of 
competition, trade in services and regulation of the intellectual property. 184  In addition, they 
reached an agreement that aimed to boost economic and commercial relations and raise the 
trade volume to one billion euros by the end of 2013.185  Lastly, related to Serbia, Turkey 
offered it a Free Trade Agreement in 2009 and gave support for its integration into NATO. To 
conclude, it supports the three countries through numerous projects and activities 
implemented by the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) in a wide range 
of fields including education, health, economy and environment. 
Therefore, according to the literature on mediation advocated by Susskind & 
Cruickshank (1987), Zartman & Touval (1985), Brookmire & Sistrunk (1980), mediation is 
not an exogenous process but a structural extension of bilateral bargaining and negotiation; 
therefore, rather than impartiality, a successful mediation is related to the possession of 
resources that either or both parties value. 186 Therefore, the Butmir Process should have been 
more successful than the Turkish mediation as EU/US could offer bigger assets than Turkey. 
Despite Turkey’s numerous cooperative agreements, even Turkey itself places EU 
membership as one of the prior goals of its foreign policies. However, to me what made the 
Turkish mediation more successful than EU/US was that Turkey offered its credits during the 
mediation process or even before and thus made the promises more credible, whereas EU 
although perceived to be the most prominent organization to establish stabilization, the parties 
often doubted the EU’s capability to realize promises. For instance, EU did not approve visa 
liberalization for Bosnia although it had reached a comparable progress level; then it made 
visa liberalization policy dependent upon the developments in the Butmir process. To the 
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local parties, this demonstrated EU’s lack of clear strategies in implementing multiple stages 
toward EU integration. Apart from it, the speaker and current president of the National 
Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, Dr. Slavica Djukic-Dejanovic, said during an official 
visit to Ankara that regional cooperation in the Balkans and enhanced ties with Turkey come 
before European integration.187
Turkey’s mediation as an individual state proved to be more successful than the 
mediation of EU which is a regional organization. Therefore, in the Turkish case none of the 
views presented in our literature holds ; neither the view that considers international 
mediators with their high prestige and the wide array of possible strategies best at resolving 
high intensity conflicts and regional mediators better at resolving low-intensity conflicts due 
to their proximity, cultural similarity and comparative informality nor that offered by 
Bercovitch and Gartner in which individual mediators appear to be the least effective at 
achieving settlement when compared to international and regional mediators despite their 
state background.
To conclude, since the literature states that previous mediation efforts are important 
but they do not surely determine the existing outcomes188, we are not analyzing this feature as 
in neither cases actually there was a reference to the previous mediation experiences. 
However, we can find information about the mediator’s previous experiences in the respective 
sections above. Lastly, the relationship between the determinant on the characteristics of the 
mediator and mediation success will be summarized in the below given Table Six. 
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TABLE 6
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MEDIATOR
POWER, RANK & 
IDENTITY
RELATIONSHIP 
WITH PARTIES
PREVIOUS 
MEDIATION 
EXPERIENCES
EU/US MEDIATION
( THE BUTMIR 
PROCESS)
Regional and 
Superpower
Positive Yes, but unsuccessful  
THE MEDIATION 
OF TURKEY
A Rising Power Positive (BOSNIA & 
CROATIA)
Mostly Negative
( SERBIA)
Yes, Successful  
7.5 Mediation Strategies 
As this study showed, the mediation guided by manipulative tactics was less 
successful than the facilitative mediation in our case of post crisis tensions. EU and US played 
a manipulative role in the negotiations by warning the immediate costs of losing the 
opportunities of EU and NATO memberships in case a solution to the current political 
stalemate was not achieved. In addition, they played a directive or substantive role by not 
simply facilitating the communication but by offering a reform package themselves. 
However, the political leaders of local parties were unsatisfied with the strategies followed 
and the proposals made by the mediators. According to Milorad Dodik , the talks were mainly 
directed towards principles rather than details of the constitutional reform, whereas the 
Croatian Representatives declared that the mediators offered a document that was too 
ambitious and almost  unacceptable for all parties. Therefore, this study advocates the 
research  conducted by Beardsley, Quinn, Biswas & Wilkenfeld (2006) and supported by 
Bercovitch & Gartner (2006) which claimed that facilitative mediation is best able to resolve 
commitment problems and ensure a reduction in post crisis tensions, whereas, manipulative 
mediation is more useful and effective in securing formal agreements and achieving overall
crisis abatement.
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Although the Butmir Process was a good idea, the mediating actors seem unwilling to 
commit the amount of time and effort to conclude the process. At the  moment that Dodik 
rejected the initial package, they quickly lowered the standards in order to make it more 
acceptable for him. However, this did not only impede the establishment of a more functional 
country but also opened the way to accommodate more extreme political options. The lack of 
clear strategies was also a result of the fact that the mediators had little to offer in exchange of 
reforms to those parties that would lose as a result of it.189
Apart from all these, the international mediators created a sense of emergency in 
Butmir by suggesting that extra-institutional and coercive means were necessary to change the 
country’s political structure.  In other words, the mediator did not treat the issues as part of 
the BiH’s conflict dynamics but as requirements to be fulfilled in order to approach EU 
membership. 
To conclude, the EU/US mediation initiative was led by a high intervention strategy 
on substantive issues such as constitutional reforms and closure of OHR. The mediators 
offered a constitutional reform package to the negotiating parties which called for the 
establishment of a centralized state system as a precondition for the closure of OHR which is 
also a precondition for BiH accession to European Union. Lastly, it offered a ‘quick fix’ 
solution to the parties by giving a sense of emergency to the situation and suggesting coercive 
means to change the current political structure. 
On the other hand, Turkey worked through a low intervention strategy by facilitating 
the meetings and building confidence measures through consultative mechanisms. This was 
demonstrated through the formation of two separate trilateral mechanisms among Turkey-
BiH – Serbia and Turkey- BiH – Croatia. The mechanisms aimed to improve relations and 
establish regular bases for direct meetings. According to Turkey, it was the lack of direct 
political relations that impeded through years the development of positive outcomes. In 
addition, it applied a participatory approach in solving the victims of war issue which ended 
up with a parliamentary resolution from the Serbian side apologizing for the massacre. 
According to Turkish officials, they helped the parties in only reaching an understanding over 
                                                            
189  Bieber F. 2010.  "Constitutional reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina". European Policy Center. p.2.
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the content of the apology as any pressure from a foreign country would not certainly work. 
Again as the speaker and current president of the National Assembly of the Republic of 
Serbia, Dr. Slavica Djukic-Dejanovic would declare “if regional problems were to be solved 
by third parties, the price would be hefty, and it will haunt us again.”190
Lastly, instead of offering carrots/ sticks in a long run as in the case of EU/US 
mediation, Turkey engaged in cooperative agreement which would immediately ease the 
economic troubles of the countries. This study strongly follows the conclusions of the 
Mediating Regional Conflicts article written by Beriker (1995) in which she compared four 
mediation initiatives in the conflict of Bosnia and claimed that the difference between the U.S 
and other mediation attempts were not only related to the type of leverage they used but also 
to the extent to which it was used by the mediator and to the extent that it was concrete, 
certain and thus more credible. 191
Table Seven serves to summarize the relationship between mediation strategies and mediation 
outcome presented in this part of the chapter. 
Table 7
MEDIATION STRATEGIES
LOW 
INTERVENTION
MIDDLE 
INTERVENTION
HIGH 
INTERVENTION
EU/US MEDIATION
( THE BUTMIR 
PROCESS)

THE MEDIATION 
OF TURKEY

                                                            
190 190“Growing Ties with Turkey More Important than EU, Serbian Parliament Speaker Says.” Today’s Zaman.  2010.  
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-230394-growing-ties-with-turkey-more-important-than-eu-serbian-parliament-speaker-
says.html, retrieved on 2 June 2011 
191 Atiyas N.B. 1995. “Mediating Regional Conflicts and Negotiating Flexibility: Peace Efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina”.
The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science November.542:1.p.199-200
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Before concluding, this study offers a joint table of all determinants of mediation outcome in 
order to understand the factors which caused change in outcome. 
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TABLE 8
                                                            
192
   X    means different 
 means same or similar.
MEDIATION IN BOSNIA192
CHARACTERISTICS OF 
THE PARTIES
NATURE OF 
THE DISPUTE
ISSUES OF THE 
DISPUTE
CHARACTERISTICS OF 
THE MEDIATOR
MEDIATION 
STRATEGIES
MEDIATION 
OUTCOME
EU/US 
MEDIATION
( THE BUTMIR 
PROCESS)
  X X X
FAILURE
THE MEDIATION 
OF TURKEY
  X X X
SUCCESS
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7.6 Concluding Remarks 
This comparative case study was extremely important in affirming some of the main 
findings in the mediation literature. It showed that the existence of multi-party regime, small 
power differences and past positive relations between the negotiating parties are crucial for 
the development of a successful mediation process. It also advocated the viewpoint that the 
mediation should start with more technical issues with which parties are not very much
attached and move to more central issues after some form of collaboration is achieved. In 
addition, it confirms that the mediator should pay attention to both tangible and intangible 
issues otherwise unresolved intangible issues may trigger rigid positions and hostile behaviors 
and thus bring the process to a deadlock.
Apart from it, the comparative case study helped us understand that mediation is more 
effective, when a conflict has gone through a few phases and it must not be initiated if the 
sides have not shown any willingness for the amelioration of the conflict. In other words, in 
order to be able to conduct a successful mediation, disputing parties need to be at the stage of 
revaluating their policies and that mostly occurs after some crises or crisis like conditions are 
fulfilled. Next, the comparative case study revealed that the greater the intensity, the higher 
the losses, the more polarized the parties’ positions will become and so more will the parties 
want to “win at all costs”.
However, contrary to the literature, our study demonstrated that individual mediators 
may be more successful than international or regional mediators. Therefore, the view that 
mediation attempts by superpowers are more likely to be successful than mediation attempts 
by medium or small powers did not hold in this case.  Apart from it, the study adds that a 
successful mediation is not only related to the possession of resources that either or both 
parties value but it is also related to the ability and willingness of the mediators to fulfill their 
promises and share these resources. Furthermore, as already advocated in current theoretical 
studies, impartiality did not appear to be an important variable. 
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Lastly, the study highly supported the research on mediation strategies claiming that 
facilitative mediation is best able to resolve commitment problems and ensure a reduction in 
post crisis tensions, whereas, manipulative mediation is more useful and effective in securing 
formal agreements and achieving overall crisis abatement.
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